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Preface
In 2008, I visited Opatija, Croatia, for a conference organized by the European
Association of Social Psychology. It happened to coincide with the European
Football Championship. On Monday, June 9th, the Dutch team would play
against Italy. My Dutch colleagues in Opatija were extremely anxious for the
match. So were our Croatian hosts. After exploring Opatija for some time,
I headed back to our hotel together with Maarten Bos (Dutch social psycholo-
gist, tall, blonde, blue eyes, cleanly shaven), Rob Holland (Dutch social psycho-
logist, tall, blonde, blue eyes, cleanly shaven), and Daniël Wigboldus (Dutch
social psychologist, tall, blonde, blue eyes, cleanly shaven). I, on the other
hand, am a Dutch social psychologist, not that tall, have dark hair, do have
blue eyes, but am too lazy to shave more than once a week. In other words, my
appearance, in the context of the match that evening, could be considered an
ambiguous stimulus.
Near our hotel we passed a bar filled with locals who were getting ready for
the match. They wore orange shirts and were clearly supporting our football
team. We thought it safe to take a short look inside. Unlike the rest of our
group, my ambiguous appearance did not fit the locals’ notion of what typical
Dutch people look like. As soon as they spotted me, several locals started to
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loudly derogate me for being Italian. According to the locals I could put my
pasta in a very special place.
How is it that I was so easily misperceived as an Italian person, within a split
second? Up to now, I would love to believe that the only reason for being seen
as Italian is that I dress a lot better than my colleagues. However, it probably
had more to do with a fascinating process that kicked in once the locals per-
ceived my face. It is called social categorization. It is such an efficient and tiny
process, that we do not even notice it. It blends in with perception and helps
us to understand the world around us. We now know that this process is the
cognitive basis of all discrimination, prejudice, and stereotyping in the world.
This dissertation explores that process in its earliest stages.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“For the most part, we do not first see, and then define; we define
first and then see.” - Walter Lippmann (1922).
Perception involves an act of categorization (Bruner, 1957). We do not see a
collection of geometrical figures. We see a chair. We understand what we see
by relating it to what we already know, by applying knowledge about sim-
ilar objects we encountered before to the object we perceive. “To categorize is
to render discriminably different things equivalent, to group the objects and
events and people around us into classes, and to respond to them in terms
of their class membership rather than their uniqueness” (Bruner, Goodnow,
& Austin, 1956). Categorization is an inevitable and necessary prerequisite for
human cognitive functioning (Bruner, 1957; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978; E. E. Smith &
Medin, 1981). We categorize other people just as we do other objects, in order
to simplify our complex social environment (Allport, 1954; Lippmann, 1922;
Tajfel, 1969). This is not a product of bad intentions, but of economy: our lim-
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ited cognitive capacity does not enable us to treat every individual as unique
(Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Instead, we automatically place people into gender,
age, ethnic, or other categories (e.g., Brewer, 1988), in an immediate fashion
without even noticing it (cf. Gibson, 1979; Neisser, 1987b). A perceived person
just appears old or young, female or male to us without any effort on our part.
The field of social psychology has primarily focused its research effort on how
categorization guides subsequent thought and behavior. However, for a long
time it has neglected to investigate the pre-categorization phase in which ap-
propriate categories are activated when a person is perceived. As a result,
we know much less about how people categorize other people than we know
about the consequences of categorizing other people. This dissertation is fo-
cused on the pre-categorization phase. In this introduction, we will first out-
line mainstream theories of social categorization. We will then discuss recent
research on the pre-categorization phase, on the basis of which we present an
extended model of social categorization. We will focus our discussion of the
extended model on the categorization of faces, which are a major source of
social information (Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010).
1.1 Social categorization
Categorical thinking is the foundation of prejudice and discrimination. As a
result of categorization, people perceive members from the same category to be
more similar and members from different categories to be more different than
they really are (Tajfel, 1969). Information regarding the social category is gen-
eralized to a categorized person (Secord, Bevan, & Katz, 1956; Taylor, Fiske, Et-
coff, & Ruderman, 1978). People experience category-based affect towards that
person (Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 1987; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; Gre-
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enwald, 1990). Furthermore, all subsequent information processing is guided
by the activated social category (Brewer, 1988). For instance, people are more
likely to remember category consistent information when they are under cog-
nitive load, as is often the case in everyday life. On the other hand, when they
are under low cognitive load, people seem to better remember category in-
consistent information (Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993; Stangor & Duan,
1991), probably because they have enough resources to trigger attributional
processes of inconsistency resolution (Sherman & Hamilton, 1994; Vonk & van
Knippenberg, 1995; for an overview see Hilton & Von Hippel, 1996; Rojahn &
Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). In both cases, memory for person
information is influenced by categorization. Moreover, people primarily pay
attention to category-relevant cues (Carver & Garza, 1984; Belmore & Hub-
bard, 1987), and seek out category-confirming information (Johnston & Mac-
rae, 1994; Rothbart, 1981).
The cognitive structure that contains the information associated with a cat-
egory is called the stereotype (Stangor & Schaller, 1996; van Knippenberg &
Dijksterhuis, 2000). Stereotypes contain all knowledge, beliefs, and expecta-
tions about a category (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Hilton & Von Hippel, 1996).
Upon categorization, stereotypes are almost always automatically activated
(Devine, 1989, but see Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Traditionally, stereotypes have
been construed as cognitive schemas (Fiske & Linville, 1980; Taylor & Crocker,
1981), abstract knowledge structures consisting of propositions that specify the
defining features and relevant attributes of a category.
Prejudice is most often construed as the negative attitude associated with a
category (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Fiske, 1998). Prejudice can be measured
directly using explicit attitude self-report measures, or indirectly, using reac-
tion time-based measurements such as the implicit association test (IAT; Green-
wald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The distinction between implicit (indirectly
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measured) and explicit (directly measured) prejudice is important, because
both types of prejudice predict different types of intergroup bias (Greenwald,
Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Dovidio, Kawakami, Smoak, & Gaertner,
2008). Explicit prejudice generally correlates with deliberate forms of behavior,
such as what a person says to an out-group member. Implicit prejudice, on the
other hand, correlates with more subtle uncontrollable behavior, such as non-
verbal behavior when speaking to out-group members (Dovidio, Kawakami, &
Gaertner, 2002; McConnell & Leibold, 2001) or how much distance one main-
tains to out-group members (Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008).
In sum, social categorization is the foundation of intergroup bias (Dijksterhuis,
2010; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). Figure 1.1 on page 5 depicts what might be
called the mainstream model of categorical perception, compatible with most
contemporary theories of person perception (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg,
1990; also see Brewer & Feinstein, 1999). Upon perception, a person is immedi-
ately categorized, which automatically activates category related information
(stereotype and prejudice). Subsequent thought and behavior are affected by
the categorization and stereotype application.
1.2 Category allocation
Current models of social categorization, such as the one in Figure 1.1, describe
primarily what Barsalou (1990) called the inference phase of categorization, the
phase in which a perceiver goes beyond the information given based on cat-
egory membership (Bruner, 1957). This reflects a strong research focus of social
psychologists on the inference phase of categorization and contrasts with the
focus of cognitive psychologists on what Barsalou called the access phase of
categorization (e.g., Barsalou, 1983; Bruner, 1957; Medin & Smith, 1984; Mervis
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Intergroup bias
Categorical inference
Prejudice
Stereotype
Perceptual input
Category activation
Figure 1.1: Mainstream model of categorical perception
& Rosch, 1981; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). The access phase,
or the category allocation phase as we will refer to it, is the stage of categor-
ization in which the appropriate category is assigned to a perceived stimulus,
and is represented in Figure 1.1 by the link between perception and categoriz-
ation. This model, we will argue, is too simplistic. It is not that social psycho-
logists have no theories about how categorization is involved in perception.
Most implicitly assume that some kind of matching process goes on in which
stimulus attributes are matched to category specifications, but this part of the
process has never been explicated in mainstream theories of social categoriza-
tion. However, the last two decades sparked a renewed interest in this specific
part of the process, as will be discussed shortly.
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The original lack of attention to the link between perception and categorization
in social psychology is most obvious in Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) description
of their influential continuum model of person perception. They simply stated
that
“the exact criteria for interpreting whether an instance fits a cat-
egory are clearly important but cannot be our primary concern here”
(p. 6).
A possible explanation of social psychology’s disinterest in the category alloc-
ation phase up to the 90’s is that in everyday life the social consequences of
categorization have so much impact on society that originally all research ef-
fort had gone into investigating their pervasiveness. Another possible reason is
of a more technological nature: presenting high quality graphical stimuli rep-
resenting actual persons requires computer hardware which was not available
until two decades ago. As a result, in most studies categories were activated by
directly providing verbal category labels, thereby sidestepping completely the
issue of how perception maps on categorization. Although categories in daily
life are inferred from people’s appearance, in the social psychological lab up to
the 90’s, people were generally replaced by category labels. Not surprisingly,
Macrae and Quadflieg (2010) stated that
“despite person perception constituting a central area of inquiry in
social psychology for decades, two elements have surprisingly been
absent in explorations of this topic - persons and perceptions” (p.
428).
As a result, an important stage of the categorization process, namely the trans-
fer from perceptual representation to conceptual representation (e.g., Barsalou,
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1999; Neisser, 1987a), is under-investigated in person perception literature.
This dissertation aims to fill this gap by focusing specifically on the category
allocation phase.
Because of the consistent use of verbal stimuli as opposed to perceptual stimuli,
theories of categorical perception might be biased towards schematic repres-
entations. For some time, several researchers have tried to appeal to the field
of person perception to stop relying solely on verbal stimuli to put the person
and perception back in person perception. Zebrowitz and colleagues have re-
peatedly argued in favor of using more ecologically valid stimuli (Zebrowitz,
1996, 2006; McArthur & Baron, 1983; Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008). Brewer
(1988) has emphasized the importance of perceptual information in person per-
ception, as have Carlston (1994), Feldman (1988), and McGarty (2002). In the
last two decades the field has slowly shifted its research focus to more ecolo-
gically valid visual stimuli (e.g., Bijlstra, Holland, & Wigboldus, 2010; Blair,
Judd, & Chapleau, 2004; Cloutier, Mason, & Macrae, 2005; Hugenberg & Bod-
enhausen, 2004; Hugenberg, 2005; Livingston & Brewer, 2002; Macrae, Boden-
hausen, & Milne, 1995; Maddox & Gray, 2002; Quinn & Macrae, 2005). At the
same time, research on the category allocation phase of person categorization
has started to emerge (discussed below).
Capitalizing on these trends and building on research in the last two decades,
in the current thesis we aim to present an extension to the mainstream model
of social categorical perception that incorporates a more detailed description
of the category allocation phase, during which perceptual input is interpreted
conceptually. Moreover, we propose changes in the assumptions on the repres-
entational form and function of the stereotype construct, in order to deal with
perceptual information. Many more extensions to the mainstream model are
possible, but it is beyond the aim of the current thesis to provide a comprehens-
ive model that encompasses all new developments in social categorization.
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1.3 An extended model of social categorical percep-
tion
The purpose of the categorization process is to find the appropriate category
for a perceived object. Categorization maps perceptual information onto con-
cepts or categories (e.g., Neisser, 1987a). After categorization, visual input is no
longer just a raw array of light intensity values, but consists of objects that have
psychological meaning. How the categorization process accomplishes this for
nonsocial, natural objects has been investigated for some time by cognitive
psychologists (Barsalou, 1990). Whether knowledge about nonsocial object
categorization can be generalized to person categorization has been a matter
of considerable debate. Social psychologists have more than once argued that
categorization of social stimuli might be fundamentally different from categor-
ization of nonsocial objects. Persons, unlike objects, tend to be dynamic rather
than static, active rather than passive, and to be perceived as causal agents
(Lingle, Altom, & Medin, 1984; Ostrom, 1984). On the other hand, Brewer
(1988) and Feldman (1988) have argued that such a distinction might be arti-
ficial and that there probably is no qualitative difference between social and
nonsocial input in the early stages of the categorization process. Feldman pro-
posed that any differences between social and nonsocial categorization might
be explained by differences in expertise with the categories. He argued that the
more experience someone has with a certain class of objects, the more elabor-
ate the cognitive structure of the category. Because people interact with other
people a lot, they build up great expertise with social categories. Similarly, bird
spotters build up expertise with the category of birds. As a result the categor-
ization of other people is just as ‘special’ as the categorization of birds for bird
spotters. This is corroborated by recent evidence from neuroscience, showing
that the fusiform face area (FFA), a brain area previously thought to be primar-
ily active when perceiving social stimuli (faces), is just as active when perceiv-
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ing objects of any nonsocial category (such as birds or cars), as long as people
have built up visual expertise regarding that category (Kanwisher, 2000; Liu &
Chaudhuri, 2003; Tarr & Gauthier, 2000; Xu, 2005). Even within the domain of
faces, expertise matters. Experience with certain types of faces during the first
year of development makes human infants more efficient in recognizing and
discriminating those faces later in life (Scott & Monesson, 2009). Regardless of
whether expertise solves the ostensible difference between social and nonso-
cial categorization, much can be learned from cognitive psychology, because
“the disagreements and controversies [...] are not between cognitive and social
psychologists [...] but between proponents of different approaches to categor-
ization that span both social and cognitive psychology”(McGarty, 1999, p. 23).
We cannot claim full understanding of the categorization phenomenon “unless
we also know who gets placed into which category and why” (Zebrowitz, 1996,
p. 80). Specifically, the question of what social stimulus will end up in which
category is central to this dissertation. Empirical work in the last two dec-
ades has significantly improved our understanding of the process of category
selection. We now know that when multiple categories pertain to the same
person, chronic and situational accessibility will be important determinants of
which category is selected (Bruner, 1957; Oakes, 1987; van Knippenberg, van
Twuyver, & Pepels, 1994). Accessibility refers to the ease with which a category
comes to mind (Bruner, 1957; Higgins, 1989; van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis,
2000). Some categories, such as gender or race categories, are chronically ac-
cessible (e.g., Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glas, 1992). Other categories, such as
students from Nijmegen, can be made accessible by priming the respective cat-
egories (e.g., van Twuyver & van Knippenberg, 1995). Moreover, the activa-
tion of one category usually inhibits accessibility of other pertaining categories
(Macrae et al., 1995; Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998). Additionally, motivational
processes may drive the selection of one category over another. For example,
in an experiment by Sinclair and Kunda (1999), participants received feedback
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from a Black doctor. When that feedback was positive, participants activated
the doctor category. However, when the feedback from the same doctor was
negative, they were more likely to activate the Black category. Furthermore,
circumstances exist in which no social category will be activated at all, for in-
stance when someone’s processing goals do not require any social categoriza-
tion (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997).
Before any selection between accessible categories can be made, the cognit-
ive system has to determine which categories pertain to a perceived person in
the first place. It has been suggested that category pertinence depends on the
normative fit between a perceived person and a category (Bruner, 1957; Oakes,
1987; van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 2000). Normative fit refers to the match
between stimulus characteristics and the characteristics a perceiver expects
members of specific categories to have. In the cognitive literature, these expect-
ations (also called category specifications) are thought to be part of the category
structure itself. How fit with category specifications is established depends on
the representational form of categories. Broadly, the cognitive literature can
be divided in four conventional representational frameworks (E. E. Smith &
Medin, 1981; also see McGarty, 1999). In the featural approach, in which cat-
egories are represented schematically, a stimulus fits a category when the stim-
ulus has a critical number of category-relevant features. In the dimensional
approach, category attributes vary on continuous dimensions. A stimulus can
be represented as a point in multi-dimensional feature space and can be said
to fit a category when the euclidian distance to a category center point is short
enough, or falls within the multi-dimensional space spanned by the category.
In the holistic approach, a stimulus fits a category when it matches a perceptual
template for that category. In this sense, templates might be prototypical im-
ages of concrete objects. Finally, the exemplar approach holds that a category is
represented by separate representations of its exemplars. There is fit between
a category and a stimulus when that stimulus resembles stored category exem-
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plars more than it resembles stored exemplars of other categories (e.g., Medin
& Schaffer, 1978).
In social psychology, expected characteristics of group members are not part of
a category representation itself, but part of the stereotype (Stangor & Schaller,
1996). Nonetheless, the described approaches to category structure can easily
be mapped onto stereotype structure. For example, the featural approach is
closest to the traditional view of stereotypes as schemata. The exemplar ap-
proach has been strongly advocated by Smith and colleagues (E. R. Smith &
Zarate, 1990, 1992). However, the exact representational organization under-
lying categories and stereotypes is not the focus of this dissertation. Rather,
we focus on the notion that whereas category specifications are part of the cat-
egory in cognitive psychological theories, in social psychology category spe-
cifications are theoretically contained in stereotypes. As category specifications
are critical for establishing fit, the implication is that stereotype content, which
traditionally has been construed as affecting the inference phase after categor-
ization takes place, might affect the category allocation phase too. This role
has been hinted at, but has never been formally investigated. For instance,
van Knippenberg and Dijksterhuis (2000) argued that “stereotypical expectan-
cies are important determinants of spontaneous categorizations” (p. 113) and
several of McGarty’s (1999) constraint relations models acknowledged the in-
fluence of background knowledge on category membership decisions (p. 23).
Finally, Blanz’ (1999) model of category salience contains a clear link between
stored stereotype content and perceived fit:
“Stored stereotypes usually comprise rules to assign stimulus per-
sons into aequivalent [sic] classes. That means stereotypes define
the criteria for including or not including stimulus persons into a
category” (pp. 45–46).
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Unfortunately, Blanz’ empirical work was aimed at keeping normative fit con-
trolled and minimized, thereby leaving the relationship between stereotype
content and fit largely unexplored (with Study 1 as notable exception, dis-
cussed shortly).
Importantly, there can be individual differences in stereotype content: While
some might believe strongly that members of a social category are criminal,
others might have weaker associations between the category and criminality.
Because the stereotype contains the specifications against which category fit
is established, people with slightly different stereotype content might put the
same person in different categories under the same circumstances. This pro-
position lies at the heart of our extended model of social categorical perception
and differs from mainstream views of categorization, as most researchers have
come to think that “different people commonly categorize the same things in
the same way” (McGarty, Yzerbyt, & Spears, 2002, p. 2). A study by Blanz
(1999, Study 1) seems superficially related to our proposition. Blanz showed
that participants who believed that a specific sports issue was more relevant
for males than females, were more likely to use the gender dimension as a
basis for categorization of people discussing this issue in a so-called ‘Who Said
What?’ paradigm (Taylor et al., 1978). These results demonstrate that a certain
categorization dimension can become more salient as a function of stereotype
content, when multiple categorization dimensions are pertinent. However, our
proposition is more subtle: given a certain salient categorization dimension,
stereotype content might affect who gets placed in which category on that di-
mension.
Ultimately, this means the stereotype is an informational construct that sup-
ports two parts of categorical perception: pattern matching (by providing the
information necessary to fit perceptual input to appropriate categories) and
pattern completion (by providing the information to fill informational gaps
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about the perceived person). Moreover, variation in stereotype content across
individuals is predicted by their level of prejudice, that is, people who are pre-
judiced towards a particular group tend to associate the group stronger with
negative stereotypical traits and weaker with positive stereotypical traits than
less prejudiced individuals (Gordijn, Koomen, & Stapel, 2001; Wittenbrink,
Judd, & Park, 1997). Because prejudice covaries with stereotype content and
stereotypes affect fit, we propose that prejudice affects fit indirectly. Figure 1.2
depicts our extended model, including these predictions.
Accessible categories
Intergroup bias
Categorical inference
Prejudice
Stereotype
Fit
Perceptual input
Category allocation
Figure 1.2: Extended model of categorical perception
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In line with the appeal to the field to use more ecologically valid stimuli (e.g.,
Zebrowitz, 1996) and the fact that the effects of stereotypes and prejudice on
the categorization process itself can only be tested when categorization of stim-
uli takes place (as opposed to using category labels as stimuli, thereby skipping
the allocation phase of categorization), we chose to test this model in the do-
main of face perception.
1.4 Face perception
Faces are a major source of social information (Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010).
They attract most of our attention when we perceive other people (Fletcher-
Watson, Findlay, Leekam, & Benson, 2008). People infer person identity (e.g.,
Bruce & Young, 1986; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000), emotional states
(Ekman, 2003), personality traits (Hassin & Trope, 2000; Secord, Dukes, &
Bevan, 1954; Todorov, Said, Engell, & Oosterhof, 2008; Zebrowitz & Monte-
pare, 2008), physical attractiveness (Rhodes, 2006), and, importantly, category
membership from faces (Brewer, 1988; Hugenberg & Sacco, 2008).
Similar to general person perception, face perception is affected by categoriz-
ation and stereotyping. Categorizing a face as Black or White influences the
perceived lightness of the face’s skin (Levin & Banaji, 2006; see also Secord et
al., 1956). Moreover, people are better at discriminating faces from two differ-
ent categories than faces from the same category, even if the between-category
physical differences are smaller than the within-category physical differences
(e.g., Corneille, Hugenberg, & Potter, 2007; Levin & Beale, 2000). Categor-
ization also biases face memory, such that faces are later remembered more
prototypically (in the direction of the category prototypes) than they origin-
ally were (Corneille, Huart, Becquart, & Brédart, 2004; Huart, Corneille, &
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Becquart, 2005). In line with automatic stereotype activation (Devine, 1989),
categorized faces are attributed stereotypical traits (e.g., Ebner, 2008; Zebrow-
itz & Montepare, 1992) and emotions (e.g., Bijlstra et al., 2010; Hugenberg &
Bodenhausen, 2003).
The present discussion of our extended model, however, focuses not on the
consequences of face categorization, but on how face categorization is estab-
lished: When does an accessible category pertain to a face? As argued above
and in line with the extended model (and, e.g., Bruner, 1957; Oakes, 1987; van
Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 2000) this is the case when there is normative
fit. Because fit is established against category specifications contained in the
stereotype, there should be better normative fit for faces that have a more ste-
reotypical facial appearance. This raises the following important question: Do
stereotypes contain representations of stereotypical faces?
We propose that stereotypes include a visual component which represents,
among other things, typical faces. This is not a new proposition. In the be-
ginning of the 20th century Lippmann (1922) originally defined stereotypes
as “pictures in our heads”, granting visual information precedence over se-
mantic information. In line with the notion that not all information can easily
be represented semantically (Klatzky, 1984), having a visual component makes
it easier for stereotypes to represent visual information such as face configura-
tions. In fact, the human brain has a complete neural network dedicated to pro-
cessing and representing faces (Haxby et al., 2000; Ishai, 2008; but see Wiggett
& Downing, 2008; Rossion, 2008). Therefore, the capacity for stereotypes to
store what Klatzky called “pictoliteral” representations should not come as
a surprise. Brewer (1988) made an extraordinarily strong case in favor of a
visual component to stereotypes. As evidence, she cited research showing that
category labels can (implicitly) elicit rich visual images of the kind of person
represented by a category label (Ashmore, Del Boca, & Titus, 1984; Klatzky,
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Martin, & Kane, 1982). Other research showed that physical appearances as-
sociated with gender stereotypes are highly linked to trait and role inferences,
more so than any semantically represented component of stereotypes (Deaux &
Lewis, 1984). Recent research on feature-based stereotyping also firmly estab-
lishes a direct link between stereotypical facial features and trait inferences or
evaluative implicit judgments (e.g., Blair, Judd, Sadler, & Jenkins, 2002; Mad-
dox & Gray, 2002; Maddox, 2004; Livingston & Brewer, 2002).
The hypothesis that stereotypes have visual representations is difficult to put
to the test directly. Brewer (1988) deemed the question of whether stereotypes
are in part represented visually empirically close to unresolvable (also see An-
derson, 1978). The problem is that visual representations and semantic rep-
resentations are difficult to disentangle in experiments, because often both can
easily be re-described either verbally or visually. In other perceptual modal-
ities such re-description might be more difficult. For instance, the auditive
component of a stereotype might consist of what people expect typical group
members’ speech to sound like, in terms of e.g., typical pitch or accented speech
(e.g., Gluszek & Dovidio, 2010). The olfactory component might store inform-
ation about typical odors of group members, which could be difficult to label
(for a discussion of labeling of odor and olfactory representation, see Wilson
& Stevenson, 2003). Although the present dissertation is limited to the visual
modality, in principle stereotypes might include representations of perceptual
information in any modality. The advantage of a visual stereotype component
(visual stereotype in short) is that in order to establish fit, the visual stereotype
can be used as a template to match the incoming visual information to. This
view is compatible with recent theorizing on general knowledge representa-
tion (e.g., Barsalou, 1999).
Typical faces represented in visual stereotypes can in our view contain in-
formation that is socially meaningful, beyond being just pure mathematical
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averages of typical group members’ faces. With socially meaningful inform-
ation we mean facial features associated with personality traits. People effi-
ciently infer traits from faces with great consensus (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008;
Hassin & Trope, 2000). The idea that facial features might represent person-
ality traits dates from ancient Greece (McNeill, 1998; Zebrowitz, 1997) and
was later formalized in the 18th century by Lavater (1772/1850) in “Essays
on physiognomy”. Because of his physiognomy, Charles Darwin was almost
not allowed to make his now famous voyage on the Beagle to the Galapagos
Islands; the ship’s captain believed him to lack the necessary character as evid-
enced by the shape of his nose (Darwin, 1887/1950, p. 36). The 19th century
Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso claimed to have “scientifically” proven
that criminal people could accurately be identified by certain facial character-
istics (Lombroso, 1876/2006; also see Todorov, 2008; Zebrowitz, 1996). Even
in the beginning of the 21th century, 80% of an Israeli student population be-
lieved that personality traits can accurately be inferred from faces (Hassin &
Trope, 2000). Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) showed that people commonly
infer personality from faces on the dimensions of trustworthiness and domin-
ance. They can do so with high consensus even after just 100 ms presentation
of the face (Willis & Todorov, 2006; also see Todorov, 2008). Sometimes, trait
inferences from faces indeed correlate with traits or behaviors of the perceived
persons. For instance, competence inferred from politicians faces is a good pre-
dictor of electoral outcome (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005). Like-
wise, inferences from faces of CEO’s predict company profits (Rule & Ambady,
2008b). Importantly, Hassin and Trope showed that knowledge about a per-
son’s personality traits biases people’s expectations about what this person’s
face will look like towards having facial features associated with those traits.
From this finding, it is just a small step to postulating that knowledge about
a group’s personality traits biases people’s expectations about what a typical
group member’s face will look like. Thus, we predict that the visual stereotype
of typical group members’ faces contains features that are associated with ste-
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reotypical traits. Because people differ in terms of stereotype content, partly as
a function of prejudice, we propose that people also differ in visual stereotype
content as a function of prejudice. That is, facial visual stereotypes of more
prejudiced individuals will contain more features associated with negative ste-
reotypical traits (and less features associated with positive stereotypical traits)
than those of less prejudiced individuals.
There is some evidence for our proposition in recent social psychological lit-
erature. Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2004) found that the more implicitly
prejudiced participants were, the more likely they were to categorize angry
racially ambiguous faces as Black. Implicit prejudice was unrelated to the like-
lihood of categorizing happy faces as Black (also see Bijlstra et al., 2010; Bijlstra,
Holland, Dotsch, & Wigboldus, in prep; Hutchings & Haddock, 2008). Assum-
ing that anger is a stereotypical trait for the Black category, these data could be
taken as evidence for an effect of stereotype content on categorization: more
prejudiced people have a stronger belief that anger is an emotional expres-
sion that is stereotypically Black, and therefore are more likely to categorize
angry faces as Black. Unfortunately, stereotype content was not measured in
Hugenberg and Bodenhausen’s work, rendering the evidence for our proposed
influence of stereotype content on social categorization circumstantial at best.
As we proposed that a visual mental representation mediates the effect of pre-
judice on categorization, in the present dissertation, we aimed to tap into this
visual mental representation.
1.5 Measuring visual stereotype content
This dissertation will not provide a direct and definite test of visual stereotype
representation, but tries to add to the accumulating body of evidence in favor
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of such a view using novel data-driven methods to quantify visual stereotype
content.1 These particular methods are called psychophysical reverse correl-
ation methods (Mangini & Biederman, 2004; Todorov et al., under review).
These methods were originally developed in the domain of auditory cogni-
tion (Ahumada & Lovell, 1971), before they were used in research on vision
(Ahumada, 1996, 2002; Beard & Ahumada, 1998; Solomon, 2002) and neuro-
physiology (Ringach & Shapley, 2004; Victor, 2005). The term reverse refers to a
reversal of the statistical relationship between stimulus and response. In con-
ventional paradigms, responses depend on meaningful manipulation of stim-
ulus attributes. This relationship is quantified by correlating fixed stimulus
attributes with responses. In reverse correlation paradigms, on the other hand,
variations in stimulus attributes are random. The correlation between stim-
uli and responses can be used to model those variations in stimulus attributes
that caused the acquired response pattern. In this type of analysis, the response
variable is fixed whereas the stimulus attributes are random. This is the reverse
of conventional analyses, hence the term: reverse correlation.
The particular class of reverse correlation methods used in this dissertation has
been termed “superstitious perception” (Gosselin & Schyns, 2003; Mangini &
Biederman, 2004), because they allow researchers to probe internal representa-
tions of categories without ever intentionally showing exemplars from those
categories. We will refer to this kind of tasks as reverse correlation image
classification tasks. Reverse correlation image classification methods are used
when researchers want to examine participants’ subjective internal represent-
ation of a category, without making any assumptions about what typical cat-
egory members look like. In a typical reverse correlation task, participants
classify variations of one single base face, unrelated to the categories of interest.
Variations are created by distorting the base face with superimposed random
1This methodological part of the introduction is loosely based on a draft version of Todorov,
Dotsch, Wigboldus, and Said (under review).
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noise. Participants classify the noisy faces in whatever categories interest the
researchers. Based on the classifications participants make, noise patterns can
be generated which optimally visualize participants’ subjective internal rep-
resentation, called classification images.
Mangini and Biederman (2004, Study 3), in their validation of the reverse cor-
relation image classification method, asked participants to make identity judg-
ments. Specifically, the base image was a morph between the faces of John
Travolta and Tom Cruise. Random sinusoid noise was superimposed on the
morph to create variations (for examples of the resulting stimuli with different
base images, see Figure 2.1 on page 24). Participants judged whether each vari-
ation was probably John Travolta, possibly John Travolta, possibly Tom Cruise,
or probably Tom Cruise. Averaging all noise patterns classified as probably
John Travolta resulted in a classification image showing what visual inform-
ation yielded a John Travolta classification. Superimposing the classification
image on the original base face resulted in an actual picture of John Travolta’s
face, or at the very least, an approximation of participants’ subjective internal
representation of his face. Likewise, averaging all noise patterns classified as
probably Tom Cruise resulted in the Tom Cruise classification image. This is a
good example of what can be achieved using a reverse correlation method. We
adapted this method to tap into the visual component of group stereotypes.
1.6 The present dissertation
In the present dissertation we test our extended model of social categorical
perception across three empirical chapters. Please note that there is not a one-
on-one mapping of chapters to specific links in the model in Figure 1.2 on
page 13. Chapter 2 focuses on the relation between prejudice and visual stereo-
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types. We tested the prediction that real world visual stereotypes are affected
by individual differences in prejudice in two studies. Dutch participants were
asked to complete a reverse correlation task to assess what they expected typ-
ical Moroccan faces to look like. Moroccans are a highly stigmatized immigrant
outgroup in the Netherlands (see Coenders, Lubbers, Scheepers, & Verkuyten,
2008) and are strongly associated with criminality (Gordijn et al., 2001). Af-
terwards, participants’ implicit prejudice was measured. Independent parti-
cipants rated the classification images resulting from the reverse correlation
task on the traits criminal and trustworthy. More prejudiced participants gen-
erated more criminal and less trustworthy classification images than less pre-
judiced participants, indicating that indeed visual stereotypes are affected by
prejudice, as predicted by our extended model.
The link between prejudice and visual stereotypes established in Chapter 2
is correlational. Therefore, in Chapter 3, we aimed to manipulate prejudice
to examine the causal effect of prejudice on visual stereotypes using a stereo-
type formation paradigm (e.g., Crawford, Sherman, & Hamilton, 2002; Sher-
man, 1996; E. R. Smith & Zarate, 1990). Participants were asked to form an
impression of a novel group, group X, based on exemplar faces and behavi-
oral information. We manipulated behavioral information to be indicative of
either the trait criminal or the trait trustworthy, while keeping exemplar faces
constant. Afterwards, we assessed participants’ visual stereotypes of group X
using a reverse correlation task similar to the one used in Chapter 2. As in the
studies in Chapter 2, the classification images were rated by independent par-
ticipants on the traits criminal and trustworthy. Classification images of par-
ticipants in the criminal group X condition were rated more criminal and less
trustworthy than those of participants in the trustworthy group X condition.
Because all participants saw the same exemplar faces during the stereotype
formation task, these results identify group members’ behavior as a cause of
bias in visual stereotypes.
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Whereas Chapters 2 and 3 focus on showing that mental representations of
typical group members’ faces can be biased, Chapter 4 investigates the con-
sequences of biased visual stereotypes for social categorization. In this last
empirical chapter we tested the predicted indirect influence of prejudice on
category allocation: prejudice predicts variations in visual stereotype content
(as shown in Chapters 2 and 3), which in turn should affect normative fit and
subsequent category allocation. This was tested using categorization tasks.
Taken together, the three chapters provide first evidence for biases in visual
stereotypes and subsequent categorization. In the final chapter, we discuss the
extent to which our extended model of social categorical perception is suppor-
ted by our empirical findings.
Chapter 2
Ethnic faces are biased in the
prejudiced mind
Prejudice biases cognition, affect, and behavior toward outgroups (Fiske, 1998).
We propose that prejudice also biases the way people conceptualize the facial
appearance of outgroup members. Popular belief holds that people’s person-
ality traits are reflected in their facial features. Hence, people’s beliefs about
outgroup traits may also be reflected in what they think faces typical for par-
ticular outgroups look like. Because prejudiced people have more negatively
stereotyped beliefs about outgroup characteristics (Fiske, 1998), we hypothes-
ize that prejudiced people also have more negatively stereotyped mental rep-
resentations of ethnic faces than less prejudiced people.
This chapter is based on Dotsch, Wigboldus, Langner, and van Knippenberg (2008).
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To test this hypothesis we conducted two studies involving the category of
Moroccans, a highly stigmatized immigrant group in the Netherlands. The
first study consisted of two parts: image construction (Part 1) and image rat-
ing (Part 2). In Part 1, participants (N = 28) produced an image of a face
based on their representation of Moroccan faces, using a forced-choice reverse-
correlation image classification technique (Mangini & Biederman, 2004). In 390
trials participants repeatedly chose the most Moroccan-looking face from two
stimulus faces presented side by side. All stimuli consisted of the same base
face with random noise superimposed1 (Figure 2.1). Within a single trial, one
stimulus consisted of the base face with a random noise pattern added, and the
other consisted of the base face with the same pattern subtracted. Averaging
all stimulus faces a participant chose as most Moroccan results in a personal
classification image (Figure 2.2). This classification image is a function of a
participant’s representation of Moroccan faces, the base face, and error.
Base image Base image + noise Base image - noise
a b
Figure 2.1: Base image used in all stimuli across both studies (a), examples of
stimuli used in the studies (b)
1The base face was the neutral male mean of the Averaged Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces
database (Lundqvist & Litton, 1998). The noise consisted of 60 superimposed sinusoid images: 6
orientations (0°, 30°, 60°, 90°, 120°, and 150°) x 5 spatial frequencies (1, 2, 4, 8, and 16 cycles per
image) x 2 phases (0, pi/2), with random contrasts.
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The relative contribution of the base face to the resulting image is unknown,
but the current technique seems to allow for a great variety of classification
images given the same base face. To illustrate, Figure 2.2 shows the average
Moroccan classification image (resulting from Part 1 of the Moroccan image
study described above) and the average classification image of 30 independent
participants who were instructed to select the most Chinese-looking stimulus
using the same procedure.
Moroccan Chinese
Figure 2.2: Averaged Moroccan classification image in Study 1 and averaged
Chinese classification image of 30 independent participants
In Part 1 of the Moroccan image study, each participant’s prejudice level was
assessed using a Single Target Implicit Association Test (ST-IAT; see Greenwald
et al., 1998; Bluemke & Friese, 2008). It measured the relative strength of neg-
ative associations compared to positive associations with Moroccan names as
indicated by reaction times. Positive ST-IAT difference scores reflect stronger
negative than positive associations with Moroccans (Mdifference = 34.77,SD =
74.92). Based on this measure, participants were divided into low-, moderate-,
and high-prejudice subgroups with cutoffs on the 33rd (3.97) and 66th percent-
ile (66.66). For each subgroup, an average classification image was calculated
representing this subgroup’s average representation of a Moroccan face (Fig-
ure 2.3).
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High prejudice
Criminal M = 1.60, SD = 1.37
Trustworthy M = -1.57, SD = 1.26 
Moderate prejudice
Criminal M = 0.16, SD = 1.95
Trustworthy M = -0.31, SD = 2.04
Low prejudice
Criminal M = -0.44, SD = 1.53
Trustworthy M = 0.51, SD = 1.64
Figure 2.3: Classification images of the three subgroups (high, medium, and
low prejudice) in Study 1. Scores below the images indicate trait ratings, on
scales ranging from -3 (not criminal or not trustworthy) to 3 (very criminal or
very trustworthy)
In Part 2, independent participants (N = 70) rated the three subgroup im-
ages on two traits related to the Moroccan stereotype. Participants were first
shown the three subgroup images to familiarize them with the stimulus set.
Subsequently, each of the three subgroup images was rated on two traits: crim-
inal (stereotypical trait) and trustworthy (counter-stereotypical trait). Image or-
der was counter-balanced and trait rating order was randomized. Analyses
of variance on the criminality, F (2, 68) = 39.00, prep > .99, η2partial = .53, and
trustworthiness ratings, F (2, 68) = 43.95, prep > .99, η2partial = .56, showed that
the classification image of highly prejudiced participants was rated as more
criminal (prep > .99) and less trustworthy (prep > .99) than the image of mod-
erately prejudiced participants, which was rated as marginally more criminal
(prep = .85) and less trustworthy (prep = .95) than the image of low prejudiced
participants.
The results of the first study suggest that representations of Moroccan faces
are biased by prejudice. We ran a second study using more trials in Part 1
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(770 trials) but otherwise identical design to enhance the quality of individual
participants’ classification images (N = 35). This allowed us to replicate the
findings of the first study on an individual rather than subgroup level. In Part
2, independent participants (N = 55) rated all individual classification images
produced in Part 1 on criminality in one block and trustworthiness in another
block. Block order was counterbalanced and image order within blocks was
randomized. Within-participant standardized regression coefficients (βs), rep-
resenting the relation between producers’ prejudice level and the current par-
ticipant’s rating of the classification image, were calculated for each rater and
each trait. Subsequent t-tests on the βs revealed that the more prejudiced the
producers, the more criminal, β¯ = .12,SD = .19, t(54) = 4.94, prep > .99, and
the less trustworthy, β¯ = −.08,SD = .17, t(52) = 3.5, prep > .99, their classific-
ation images were rated.
These results suggest that people’s representations of ethnic faces are related
to their level of prejudice. Future research should provide more insight into
the nature of these representations. Furthermore, other factors that moderate
mental representations of groups may be identified besides prejudice, such as
context or specific derogatory group labels. The present results have import-
ant implications for whom people identify as members of stigmatized groups.
They suggest that prejudiced people have a more criminal-looking prototype
of Moroccan faces. Since more prototypical exemplars are processed more flu-
ently (Winkielman, Halberstadt, Fazendeiro, & Catty, 2006), prejudiced indi-
viduals may find it easier to categorize criminal-looking Moroccan faces as
Moroccan than innocent-looking Moroccan faces. This may function as a ste-
reotype maintaining device.
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Chapter 3
Visual stereotype formation:
Behavioral information biases
facial representations of new
groups
Stereotypes are cognitive structures that contain the knowledge, beliefs, and
expectations about groups (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Hilton & Von Hippel,
1996; Stangor & Schaller, 1996; van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 2000). People
form a great number of stereotypes in the course of their lives, through pro-
cesses of (non-)conscious covariance detection (Ford & Stangor, 1992; Jussim,
1991; Lewicki, 1986), illusory correlation (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; Hamilton
This chapter is based on Dotsch, Wigboldus, and van Knippenberg (under review).
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& Sherman, 1989; Mullen & Johnson, 1990), or social learning and communic-
ation (e.g., Hirschfeld, 1995; Wigboldus, Semin, & Spears, 2000). These form-
ation processes can be induced in lab experiments (e.g., Crawford et al., 2002;
Sherman, 1996; E. R. Smith & Zarate, 1990). In these experiments, participants
typically receive information about traits or behaviors of exemplars of a novel
category. If those exemplars on average possess a certain trait and variability
across exemplars is low, associations between groups and traits will be formed
(Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1999). These stereotypical associations are
formed more readily when group members are perceived as a unified entity
(i.e., highly entitative; Campbell, 1958; Crawford et al., 2002; Hamilton & Sher-
man, 1996).
Most stereotype formation research assessed newly formed stereotype con-
tent at the level of verbal trait and behavior descriptions. On the basis of
these measurements, one might assume stereotype content to be abstract and
schematic (e.g., Higgins & Bargh, 1987). However, stereotypes were originally
defined as “pictures in our heads” (Lippmann, 1922). McArthur and Baron
(1983) emphasized the contribution of physical appearance to stereotyping, as
did Brewer (1988), Carlston (1994), and McGarty (2002). Perceptual informa-
tion may even be the primary basis of conceptual knowledge (Barsalou, 1999).
In this view, the nature of stereotype content is for an important part perceptual
(Zebrowitz, 1996). Perceptual stereotype content might contain visual informa-
tion (e.g., group members’ typical physical appearance) as well as information
from any other modality. For instance, the auditive component of the stereo-
type might consist of what people expect typical group members’ speech to
sound like, in terms of e.g. typical pitch or accented speech (e.g., Gluszek &
Dovidio, 2010).
Only recently have social psychologists begun to appreciate the visual com-
ponent of stereotypes by using faces as stimuli in research (e.g., Bijlstra et al.,
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2010; Blair et al., 2002; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004; Hugenberg, 2005;
Livingston & Brewer, 2002; Macrae & Martin, 2007; Maddox & Gray, 2002;
Mason, Cloutier, & Macrae, 2006). Indeed, in research on existing stereotypes
“faces finally have found favor” (Zebrowitz, 2006). However, research on ste-
reotype formation has, to our knowledge, as yet mostly ignored this visual
component. With the current study, we aim to bridge that gap by assessing the
visual component of newly formed stereotypes.
3.1 Faces as visual stereotype content
Because faces are an important source of information to establish category
membership, group members’ typical facial appearance is likely to be included
in the visual stereotype. A newly formed visual stereotype might simply entail
aggregating all previously encountered group members’ facial configurations.
On the other hand, faces are not just pure feature configurations, but take on
social meaning as people infer traits from faces (Todorov et al., 2008; Zebrowitz
& Montepare, 2008). Moreover, people use knowledge about someone’s per-
sonality as a source of information about facial appearance (Hassin & Trope,
2000). Therefore, it is likely that after encountering several group members,
the resulting visual stereotype is biased towards facial features associated with
traits inferred from the behavior of those group members.
Visual content of stereotypes can be assessed with reverse correlation methods
(Ahumada & Lovell, 1971; Dotsch et al., 2008; Mangini & Biederman, 2004).
Specifically, these have been called superstitious perception methods (Gosselin
& Schyns, 2003), because they allow researchers to probe internal representa-
tions of categories without ever intentionally showing exemplars from those
categories. In a typical reverse correlation task, participants select from ran-
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domly generated face variations those that best match their expectations of
what typical category members look like. Based on their choices in a large
number of trials, a classification image can be calculated, representing parti-
cipants’ visual stereotype content.
Using such a method, Dotsch et al. (2008) visualized what Dutch participants
expected typical Moroccan faces to look like. Moroccans are a stigmatized
immigrant minority group in the Netherlands (Coenders et al., 2008) and are
strongly associated with the trait criminal (Gordijn et al., 2001). The visualized
stereotype content in the Dotsch et al. study revealed that on average parti-
cipants expected Moroccan faces to look criminal. Importantly, this effect was
strongest for participants who had a more negative attitude towards Moroc-
cans, i.e., who were more prejudiced. Thus, prejudiced people have visual ste-
reotypes that are biased towards features associated with negative traits (also
see Dotsch, Wigboldus, & van Knippenberg, under revision). However, the
question remains whether these biased visual stereotypes can be caused by the
inference of stereotypical traits from observed behaviors, as argued previously.
3.2 The current work
We propose the following causal relationship: information about behavior dia-
gnostic of an out-group’s traits will bias perceivers visual stereotypes of typical
out-group faces towards having facial features corresponding with the inferred
traits. We tested this hypothesis using a stereotype formation task in which
we showed descriptions of exemplar behavior alongside exemplar faces. We
manipulated exemplar behavioral information to reflect either trustworthy or
criminal traits, while keeping exemplar faces constant. We then assessed par-
ticipants’ visual stereotype content using a reverse correlation task similar to
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Dotsch et al. (2008). We predicted that the visualized stereotype would vary in
line with the manipulation.
Moreover, in order to replicate the findings of Dotsch et al. (2008) that pre-
judice (i.e., a negative attitude) predicts bias in visual stereotype content, we
measured participants’ explicit and implicit attitude towards the novel group.
Although implicit attitudes are often thought to stem from long-term socializ-
ation experiences (e.g., Rudman, 2004; Rudman, Phelan, & Heppen, 2007, but
see Castelli, Carraro, Gawronski, & Gava, 2010), both explicit and implicit at-
titudes towards groups can be induced in the lab in just a single stereotype
formation session (see Ratliff & Nosek, 2010). When no norm exists that pre-
vents participants from explicitly stating a negative evaluation, there usually
is a correlation between explicit and implicit attitudes (Greenwald, Poehlman,
Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009, also see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). We there-
fore expected both explicit and implicit attitudes to vary in line with the beha-
vioral information manipulation. Moreover, we expected both implicit and
explicit attitudes to mediate the effect of the manipulation on visual stereotype
content.
3.3 Method
3.3.1 Participants
Seventy-seven students (13 males, Mage = 22.36,SD = 4.91) from Radboud
University Nijmegen participated in the stereotype formation study. They re-
ceived €5 or course credits for participating.
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3.3.2 Overview and Design
The basic experiment consisted of two tasks, the stereotype formation and the
reverse correlation task. In the stereotype formation task participants formed
an impression of two novel groups, X and Y, based on exemplar faces and
behavioral descriptions. For half of the participants the group X behaviors
were predominantly indicative of the trait trustworthy and group Y behaviors
predominantly indicative of the trait criminal. For the other half this was re-
versed. After a filler task, we visualized participants’ representation of typical
group X faces using a reverse correlation task (Dotsch et al., 2008; Mangini &
Biederman, 2004), yielding so-called classification images. To assess the ex-
tent to which participants’ representations of group X faces varied in line with
the trustworthy or criminal behavior manipulation, independent participants
rated the resulting classification images on both traits.
The experimental design consisted of one between-participants factor (group X
behavioral information: trustworthy vs. criminal). Additionally, the design in-
cluded several counter-balancing factors to control for, e.g., effects of order and
exemplar faces. These will be explained in more detail later. After the reverse
correlation task,we measured implicit and explicit attitude towards group X.
3.3.3 Materials
Stereotype formation task
In the stereotype formation task (adapted from Crawford et al., 2002) parti-
cipants were instructed to form an impression of two novel groups, X and Y,
based on exemplar faces and behavioral descriptions presented on a computer
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screen. They received this information in two blocks, one block per group.
Block order was counter-balanced. In total, participants viewed 20 exemplar
faces and behaviors per group. In each trial a label of the current group (Group
X or Group Y) was presented at the top of the screen, with an exemplar face in
the center of the screen, and a behavioral description beneath it. The task was
self-paced.
The exemplar faces consisted of one of two base faces (one for each group,
counter-balanced across participants, see Figure 3.1 on page 36) with super-
imposed noise that distorted the faces to create subtle variations on the base
face. The two base faces were selected from the Radboud Face Database (RaFD;
Langner et al., 2010). The selected faces (models 7 and 23) were matched in
valence and showed a neutral expression. The images were cropped to 512 x
512 pixels, converted to grayscale, and were blurred with a low-pass gaussian
filter (with a kernel spanning 20 pixels in both image axes) to better match the
spatial frequency band of the noise. The noise was constructed in the same
manner as in Dotsch et al. (2008), i.e., by superimposing multiple layers of si-
nusoids with random amplitudes in six orientations, five spatial frequencies,
and two phases1. We created two sets of 20 noise patterns, one set for each
base face (counter-balanced across participants), resulting in 20 exemplar faces
for one group and 20 exemplar faces for the other group (see Figure 3.1b on
page 36 for examples).
Exemplar faces of one group were paired with 10 neutral behaviors (e.g., This
member of group X/Y crosses the street) and 10 trustworthy behaviors (e.g., This
member of group X/Y returns the wallet he found). Exemplar faces of the other
group were paired with 10 different neutral behaviors and 10 criminal behavi-
1The random noise pattern consisted of superimposed truncated sinusoid images in 6 orienta-
tions (0°, 30°, 60°, 90°, 120°, and 150°) x 5 spatial frequencies (1, 2, 4, 8, and 16 cycles per image) x 2
phases (0, pi/2), with random contrasts (amplitudes). In sum, the random noise was a function of
4092 parameters.
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A
B
Figure 3.1: Base faces (a) and example stimuli in stereotype formation task for
each base image (b)
ors (e.g., This member of group X/Y robs another person in an alley). The specific
face-behavior pairings were randomized within groups. Which set of 10 neut-
ral behaviors was associated with what group was counter-balanced across
participants. Exemplar order was randomized.
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Reverse correlation task
To visualize the face participants expected typical group X members to have,
we used a two-alternative forced choice reverse correlation task adapted from
Dotsch et al. (2008); also see Mangini and Biederman (2004). In 480 trials par-
ticipants repeatedly chose from two faces presented side-by-side the face that
most likely was a member of group X. All faces in this task were generated
using as base face the average of the two blurred base faces from the stereo-
type formation task (Figure 3.2a). Averaging the two base faces ensured that
stimuli in the reverse correlation task were equally likely to resemble group X
and group Y faces. We generated random noise patterns in exactly the same
manner as for the stereotype formation task (see Footnote 1). In a single trial,
one stimulus consisted of the base face with a random noise pattern and the
other with the inverse pattern superimposed (Figure 3.2b). Because the ran-
dom noise patterns distorted the base face, the faces appeared to be different
in every trial. All participants received identical sets of noisy stimuli, but in
random order. Averaging all noise patterns chosen as group X member per
participant resulted in individual classification images, representing what a
participant expected typical group X members to look like. These classification
images constitute an approximation of participants’ visual group X stereotype,
given the used base image, the set of random noise patterns, and error.
Because the reverse correlation task is a long and tedious task, it is not un-
common for participants to become demotivated after some time and start re-
sponding randomly. Trials on which participants responded faster than 300 ms
were assumed to reflect no processing of the presented stimuli and therefore
an indication of demotivation. To ensure high classification image quality, we
decided a priori to exclude participants who responded faster than 300 ms on
more than 25% of all trials.
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A B C
Figure 3.2: Averaged base face (a), example stimuli with noise superimposed
(b) and inverse noise superimposed (c)
Implicit Association Test
In the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998), participants clas-
sified positive and negative words (e.g., love, death) and the group labels Group
X and Group Y into categories. Our IAT consisted of five blocks in the following
fixed order:
1. A practice block (20 trials) in which participants classified positive words
with the left key, and negative words with the right key;
2. A practice block (20 trials) in which participants classified positive words
and the label Group X with the left key and negative words and the label
Group Y with the right key;
3. A target block (40 trials), with the same key mapping as the previous
block;
4. A practice block (20 trials), in which participants practiced the reversed
mapping of the group labels: classifying positive words and the label
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Group Y with the left key and negative words and the label Group X with
the right key;
5. A target block (40 trials), with the same key mapping as the previous
block.
In each block every type of stimulus was shown an equal number of times.
Within blocks, the order of stimuli was randomized. Faster responses in Blocks
2 and 3 than in Blocks 4 and 5 were assumed to indicate stronger positive than
negative associations with group X and stronger negative than positive associ-
ations with group Y.
Explicit measures
Using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (I strongly disagree) to 7 (I strongly agree)
we asked participants to indicate their agreement to two statements measur-
ing how positive and how negative they evaluated group X (I have a positive
evaluation of group X; I have a negative evaluation of group X).
Instructional Manipulation Check
To identify participants who did not take the experiment seriously we embed-
ded an item in a bogus questionnaire with 7-point scales as instructional ma-
nipulation check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). The critical item
read: “To confirm that you are reading the text on the screen, please respond
by pressing ‘p’ ”, and looked exactly like a normal item. Participants could re-
spond by pressing ‘p’, indicating that they were paying attention, or with any
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number as they would with a regular 7-point scale, indicating that they were
not paying attention to the instructions on screen.
Rating task
To quantify the extent to which classification images reflected meaningful vari-
ation caused by the behavioral information manipulation 105 independent par-
ticipants (25 males, Mage = 22.48,SD = 4.29) rated the individual classification
images on trustworthiness and criminality. They received €2 or course credits
in return. In a block per trait participants rated all images using a 9-point scale
ranging from 1 (not trustworthy/criminal) to 9 (very trustworthy/criminal). Trials
in which raters responded faster than 300 ms have been removed. For each
classification image we calculated the averaged trustworthiness and crimin-
ality ratings. The average trustworthiness and criminality ratings correlated
r(58) = −.96 with each other and are, hence, completely redundant. There-
fore, only the average criminality ratings per image are reported as dependent
variables in data analysis.
3.3.4 Procedure
Participants started with the stereotype formation task, in which they were
asked to form an impression of group X and group Y based on group members’
pictures and behavioral descriptions. It was explained to them that the beha-
vioral descriptions represented typical behavior of the group member whose
picture they were viewing and that random-noise was added to pictures to
make it more difficult to recognize the faces underneath.
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We aimed to create strong associations between groups and traits. Because
transference of traits from individual group members to other members of the
group is strongest for groups that are perceived to be highly entitative (e.g.,
Crawford et al., 2002), all participants received the same high entitativity in-
struction before each block of the stereotype formation task:
“The members of group X [Y] are very similar to each other and do
not differ in many ways from each other. The members come from
similar backgrounds and have the same opinions, similar import-
ant beliefs, and similar personalities. Across a variety of situations,
members of group X [Y] will act in a similar manner.” (Crawford et
al., 2002, p. 1080).
After the stereotype formation task, participants completed an unrelated filler
task, which lasted on average about 18 minutes. They then proceeded with the
reverse correlation task, the IAT, explicit measures, and instructional manipu-
lation check. Afterwards, participants were debriefed and thanked.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Data preprocessing
Implicit Association Test
We processed the IAT data using the classic algorithm (Greenwald et al., 1998).
The first two trials of each block and incorrect trials (6.23%) were removed from
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analysis. Latencies below 300 ms were recoded to 300 ms (< 1%). Latencies
above 3000 ms were recoded to 3000 ms (< 1%). All latencies were then log-
transformed (untransformed latencies are reported). We calculated IAT scores
for each participant by subtracting the average response latency in Blocks 2
and 3 from the average response latency in Blocks 4 and 5. A positive IAT score
therefore indicated stronger positive than negative associations with group X
(and stronger negative than positive associations with group Y).
Reverse correlation task
We generated classification images representing what participants expected
typical group X members to look like (i.e., their visual group X stereotype)
based on the reverse correlation data. Trials with response latencies below 300
ms were excluded from analysis (2.20%). The classification images were cal-
culated by averaging the sinusoid amplitude parameters of the selected noise
patterns. The resulting average noise patterns were then superimposed on the
base image to create the final classification image for each participant. In or-
der to visually illustrate the effect of the behavioral information manipulation
we calculated averaged classification images for the participants in the crim-
inal and trustworthy conditions separately (see Figure 3.3 on page 43). The
individual classification images were rated on criminality by independent par-
ticipants as described in the method section. For each image we calculated
the averaged criminality rating, which was used as dependent variable in sub-
sequent analyses.
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A B
Figure 3.3: Averaged classification images for trustworthy behavioral inform-
ation condition (a) and for criminal behavioral information condition (b)
Exclusion criteria
To ensure good classification image quality, 15 participants who in the reverse
correlation task responded faster than 300 ms on more than 25% of the trials
were assumed to be demotivated by the large number of trials. They were
therefore removed from the data on a priori grounds, as was described in the
method section and their classification images were not included in the rating
task. One participant did not give the correct answer on the instructional ma-
nipulation check and was removed from further analysis. Three participants
who scored 2.5 SD below or above the average IAT score within their respect-
ive behavioral information conditions were removed from analysis. The final
data set contained 58 participants.
3.4.2 Analyses
Preliminary analyses indicated that none of the counterbalancing factors from
the stereotype formation task interacted with the effects of interest on crimin-
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ality ratings (all Fs < 1). We therefore dropped the counterbalancing factors
from subsequent analyses, leaving only one between-subjects factor: behavi-
oral information condition (criminal vs. trustworthy). As predicted, classific-
ation images of participants in the criminal behavioral information condition
were rated as more criminal (M = 5.26,SD = 0.70, n = 31) than classifica-
tion images of participants in the trustworthy behavioral information condi-
tion (M = 4.86,SD = 0.77, n = 27), t(56) = 2.07, p = .04, d = 0.55.
Participants’ IAT scores also varied as a function of behavioral information
condition, t(56) = 2.16, p = .04, d = 0.58. Participants in the trustworthy beha-
vioral information condition had stronger positive than negative associations
with group X (M = 65.02,SD = 75.07) compared to participants in the crim-
inal behavioral information condition (M = 23.59,SD = 67.34). Moreover,
participants in the trustworthy behavioral information condition had more
positive (M = 6.26,SD = 0.94 vs. M = 2.77,SD = 1.89) and less negat-
ive (M = 2.56,SD = 1.65 vs. M = 5.32,SD = 1.90) explicit evaluations of
Group X than those in the criminal behavioral information condition, respect-
ively t(56) = 8.67, p < .01, d = 2.32, and t(56) = 5.52, p < .01, d = 1.48. Pos-
itive and negative explicit evaluations were highly correlated with each other
(r = −.79). Therefore, in subsequent analyses the difference score (positive −
negative evaluation) was used as a general measure of explicit evaluation. A
higher difference score reflects a more positive explicit evaluation.
We predicted that both implicit and explicit attitudes would mediate the be-
havioral information effect on classification image criminality. These hypo-
theses can be tested using within rater regressions to capture the mediation for
each rater (i.e., policy capturing; Aarts, Verplanken, & van Knippenberg, 1997;
Brehmer & Joyce, 1988; Dotsch et al., 2008). In this analytical strategy, the hy-
potheses are confirmed when we demonstrate on average a relation between
behavioral information manipulation and classification image criminality per
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rater (i.e., β¯1), a relation between the potential mediator (IAT scores or explicit
evaluation) and classification image criminality per rater (i.e., β¯2), and a re-
lation between behavioral information manipulation and classification image
criminality per rater when controlling for the mediator (i.e., β¯3) which should
be weakened (i.e., β¯3 < β¯1). Note that a relation between behavioral inform-
ation manipulation and the potential mediators (IAT scores and explicit eval-
uation) has already been established above. As can be seen in Table 3.1 on
page 46, which summarizes the within rater regressions, the effect of behavi-
oral information manipulation on classification image criminality ratings was
partially mediated by IAT scores (as β¯3 was different from 1, p < .01, but also
different from zero, p < .01) and fully mediated by explicit evaluation (as β¯3
was different from 1, p < .01, and not different from zero, n.s.). The reverse
model, that the effect of behavioral information manipulation on IAT scores is
partially mediated by classification image criminality, was also significant.
Table 3.2 on page 47 reports the entire correlation matrix on the level of par-
ticipants (instead of on the level of raters as was the case in Table 1). The
first column of Table 3.2 shows that the manipulation correlates stronger with
explicit evaluation than with IAT scores (z = 3.14, p < .01). It is possible
that the IAT scores contain variance that uniquely predicts classification im-
age criminality variance above and beyond the explicit evaluation. However,
when controlling for explicit evaluation while regressing IAT scores on classi-
fication image criminality ratings using the policy capturing method described
above, the IAT β¯ was not significantly different from zero. Moreover, explicit
attitudes predicted classification image criminality when controlling for IAT
scores, β¯ = −.20, t(104) = 12.82, p < .01.
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Table 3.1: Policy capturing analyses of mediation of the effect of behavioral informa-
tion manipulation on classification image criminality ratings
Mediator
Implicit Explicit
Predictor M SD M SD
β1 Effect of behavioral information
on criminality ratings
.13 ** .13 .13 ** .13
β2 Effect of mediator on criminality
ratings
.06 ** .10 -.19 ** .15
β3 Effect of behavioral information
on criminality ratings when con-
trolling for mediator
.12 ** .13 .00 .16
Test of mediation t p t p
β¯3 < β¯1 3.34 .01 10.43 .01
* significantly different from 0, p < .05; ** significantly different from 0,
p < .01; all df s = 104.
3.5 Discussion
Using a stereotype formation task we tested whether behavioral information
diagnostic of an out-group’s traits biases perceivers’ visual stereotypes of typ-
ical out-group faces towards having facial features corresponding with the in-
ferred traits. Our hypothesis was confirmed: visual stereotypes of participants
in the criminal behavioral information condition were judged to be more crim-
inal than those of participants in the trustworthy behavioral information con-
dition. Because the presented exemplar faces were kept constant, the reported
bias in visual stereotypes could only be caused by exemplars’ behavioral in-
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Table 3.2: Correlation matrix based on between-participants covariance
1. 2. 3.
1. Manipulation (1 = criminal, -1 = trustworthy)
2. Classification Image Criminality .27
3. IAT Score (Higher is more positive) -.28 -.27
4. Explicit Evaluation (Higher is more positive) -.71 -.49 .35
All correlations p < .05.
formation. To our knowledge, the current work is the first in demonstrating
experimental effects of behavioral information on visual stereotypes. These
findings suggest that in every day life people indeed have biased visual rep-
resentations of social groups, as Lippmann (1922) suspected a long time ago.
Participants’ explicit and implicit attitudes were in line with the behavioral
information manipulation. This replicates work by Ratliff and Nosek (2010),
who induced both implicit and explicit attitudes in a similar stereotype forma-
tion paradigm, using personality traits instead of behavioral information, and
without any visual information. The behavioral information manipulation had
a stronger effect on explicit attitudes than implicit attitudes. This fits theories
stating that the implicit system learns more slowly than the explicit system
(Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Sloman, 1996; E. R. Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Per-
haps leaving more time between stereotype formation and attitude assessment
or presenting more group exemplars would increase the effect of behavioral in-
formation on implicit attitudes. Additionally, the IAT might be a noisier meas-
ure than explicit ratings. For instance, the IAT score not only reflects implicit
attitudes, but also individual differences in task switching capacity (Mierke &
Klauer, 2003; Klauer & Mierke, 2005), generating spread across participants
unrelated to the behavioral information manipulation.
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Moreover, the IAT score showed a positivity bias (i.e., the average IAT score
was not negative in the criminal behavioral information condition). One pos-
sible source of bias is the fixed IAT block order. Group X was always first
paired with positive stimuli (and Y with negative). This may have slightly
strengthened the association of group X with positive valence (and Y with neg-
ative) as a result of which the later reversal (i.e., paring group X with negative
and Y with positive) may have yielded slower responses. Thus, this order of
IAT blocks may have artifactually produced slightly more positive evaluations
of group X and slightly more negative evaluations of group Y. Another source
of bias might be the fact that the IAT, pitting group X against group Y, was ad-
ministered after participants performed the extensive reverse correlation task
which was focused only on group X. This greater exposure to group X than
to group Y might have induced a positivity bias towards group X in a similar
way as the implicit partisanship effect (Greenwald, Pickrell, & Farnham, 2002;
Pinter & Greenwald, 2005). Nonetheless, people had relatively more negative
implicit attitudes in the criminal behavioral information condition than in the
trustworthy behavioral information condition.
Participants’ implicit attitudes mediated the effect of the behavioral inform-
ation manipulation on visual stereotypes, such that participants in the crim-
inal behavioral information manipulation had more negative implicit attitudes,
which in turn was related to a more criminal-looking visual stereotype. This
essentially is a replication of Dotsch et al. (2008), in which more implicitly pre-
judiced participants (i.e., participants with stronger negative implicit attitudes)
had more criminal-looking mental representations of typical out-group faces.
However, behavioral information might not be the only source of the biased
implicit attitudes and face representations. Because people read trait inform-
ation from faces (e.g., Todorov et al., 2008), exemplar facial appearance might
further bias attitudes and face representations, perhaps in interaction with be-
havioral information. This might be addressed in future research. Note that in
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the present study exemplar facial appearance was kept constant across behavi-
oral information conditions.
Explicit attitudes likewise mediated the effect of the behavioral information
manipulation on visual stereotypes. Here the alternative mediational model
of behavioral information affecting explicit attitudes through the visual stereo-
type was rejected on statistical grounds. Dotsch et al. (2008) did not report
any correlations between explicit attitudes and visual stereotypes of Moroc-
can faces. Re-analysis of their data (Dotsch et al., Study 2) for the purpose of
the current work showed that neither positive nor negative explicit attitudes
correlated with the criminality or trustworthiness judgments of participants’
visual stereotypes of Moroccan faces. This might be explained by a social norm
not to appear explicitly prejudiced towards real-world groups (Crandall, Esh-
leman, & O’Brien, 2002; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). This norm might not be in
place for the novel group in the current study.
It should be noted that one alternative mediational model, entailing that be-
havioral information condition affected implicit attitudes through the visual
stereotype, cannot be excluded from a statistical point of view. This would
mean that behavioral information affects explicit attitudes, which affect the
visual stereotype, which in turn affects implicit attitudes. This model is theor-
etically less parsimonious than the simple model we proposed, i.e., that beha-
vioral information affects the visual stereotype through both implicit and ex-
plicit attitudes. Importantly, evidence for the direct link between information
manipulation and implicit attitude is provided by the previously mentioned
work by Ratliff and Nosek (2010). The critical test in this respect would be to
manipulate the mediators independently with a stronger induction of implicit
attitudes (see e.g., McConnell, Rydell, Strain, & Mackie, 2008).
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In the stereotype formation task, each group was assigned only one trait, op-
posite in valence. It is therefore unclear whether the classification images re-
flect valence or actually the traits criminal or trustworthy. Future research
could tease apart the influence of valence and specific traits (similar to Amodio
& Devine, 2006) by inducing multidimensional stereotypes.
The current work demonstrates the usefulness of reverse correlation tasks to
lay bare the visual content of stereotypes. However, the outcome of reverse
correlation tasks, a classification image, should not be equated with visual ste-
reotype content, however tempting. At most, a classification image can be ar-
gued to be an approximation of visual stereotype content, affected and con-
strained by contextual and task-specific factors, such as the underlying base
face image, the specific set of noise patterns, and motivation. This is not unlike
other measurements in psychological research, which are approximations of a
not directly observable latent construct (Lord & Novick, 1968).
The major contribution of the present study is that it establishes a causal link
between behavioral information about exemplars and the expected facial ap-
pearance of group members. With this study, we hope to entice the field of
stereotype formation to shift its focus on abstract and schematic stereotype
content to more perceptual stereotype content.
Chapter 4
Biased allocation of faces to
social categories
As much as we would like to individuate everyone we meet, we effortlessly
and automatically categorize persons into groups to simplify and make sense
of the enormous amount of social information in the world (Allport, 1954). Al-
though much research exists on the consequences of categorization (e.g., Fiske,
1998; Tajfel, 1969; Turner, 1987), our knowledge about the category selection
process itself is rather limited. We cannot claim full understanding of the cat-
egorization phenomenon “unless we also know who gets placed into what
categories and why” (Zebrowitz, 1996, p. 80). Processing goals, motivational
states, and (chronic) accessibility have been identified as some of the determ-
inants of category selection and paint a clear picture of why specific categories
have a higher probability to be selected when a target person belongs to mul-
This chapter is based on Dotsch, Wigboldus, and van Knippenberg (under revision).
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tiple categories (Hugenberg & Sacco, 2008; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, &
Calvini, 1999; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997; van Knip-
penberg, van Twuyver, & Pepels, 1994). However, before this selection can be
made, the cognitive system has to determine which categories pertain to a per-
ceived person in the first place. In the current paper we test the prediction that
at this early stage of social categorization, the very process of category alloca-
tion is biased.
Category allocation has been investigated as early as the late 1950’s. Pettigrew,
Allport, and Barnett (1958) conducted a binocular rivalry experiment in South
Africa in which they briefly presented, among other combinations, a White face
to one eye and a face with darker skin tone (colored, African, or Indian) to the
other eye. Despite the dual stimulus, participants perceive this as one single
face. Afrikaners, i.e., white people who in the past were generally in favor of
racial separation (Dubow, 1992), were more prone to allocate any combination
of White and non-white stimulus faces to a non-White category than English
White, African, or Indian participants. Pettigrew et al. explained these findings
as an effect of prejudice on the allocation of ambiguous exemplars to racial
categories. These data constitute preliminary evidence for biases in category
allocation.
When does a category pertain to a perceived person? It has been sugges-
ted that there has to be normative fit between that person and the category
(Bruner, 1957; Oakes, 1987; van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 2000). Normative
fit refers to the match between stimulus characteristics and the characterist-
ics a perceiver expects members of specific categories to have. For instance,
when the features or configuration of a perceived face matches someone’s ex-
pectations of what typical Chinese faces look like, there is normative fit. The
stereotype is the cognitive structure containing these expectations (Stangor &
Schaller, 1996; van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 2000). Importantly, this means
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that normative fit is affected by the idiosyncratic content of the stereotype. If
a culturally shared stereotype holds that members of a specific category are
criminal, a person endorsing this stereotype will expect category members to
look criminal, and therefore, normative fit will be enhanced when this person
perceives a criminal-looking person.
There can be individual differences in the extent to which people endorse cul-
turally shared stereotypes: While some might believe strongly that members of
a social category are criminal, others might have weaker associations between
the category and criminality. Importantly, this variation across individuals
is predicted by their level of prejudice, i.e., the extent to which they have a
negative evaluation of the category as a whole (Gordijn et al., 2001; Witten-
brink et al., 1997). To the extent that highly prejudiced people believe category
members to be criminal, they will expect people of that group to look more
criminal. This relationship recently has been established within the domain
of faces. Dotsch, Wigboldus, Langner, and van Knippenberg (2008), used a
forced-choice paradigm to reconstruct what people believed typical Moroc-
can faces looked like (Moroccans are a highly stigmatized immigrant group
in the Netherlands, see Coenders et al., 2008; Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005,
and strongly associated with the trait criminal; Gordijn et al.). Facial images
produced by highly prejudiced people depicted faces that were more criminal-
looking than those produced by people low in prejudice.
Because highly prejudiced individuals expect Moroccan people to be more
criminal, criminal-looking faces have better normative fit for the Moroccan
category and, therefore, highly prejudiced individuals should be more likely
to categorize criminal-looking stimulus faces as Moroccan.
Alternatively, Ruys, Dijksterhuis, and Corneille (2008) proposed an evaluative
fit hypothesis such that social categorization is facilitated for exemplars that are
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evaluatively congruent with the target category. With regard to the Moroccan
category this means that because highly prejudiced individuals evaluate the
Moroccan category more negatively, negative-looking faces have better evalu-
ative fit for the Moroccan category and, therefore, highly prejudiced individu-
als should be more likely to categorize criminal-looking stimulus faces as Mo-
roccan. The difference between evaluative fit and normative fit is that the first
only concerns valence congruity due to prejudice, while the latter involves ste-
reotypicality. It is often difficult to disentangle prejudice-related valence from
stereotyping (e.g., Amodio & Devine, 2006; Wittenbrink et al., 1997), because
for the majority of social categories the two concepts seem to be confounded:
e.g., the trait criminal – which is stereotypical for Moroccans – is negative, and
the Moroccan category itself is negatively evaluated. However, in our view
prejudice and stereotyping have clearly identifiable – but interacting – contri-
butions to fit.
Evaluative fit cannot possibly account for the vast number of potential social
categories that can be allocated given a stimulus of some valence. The uni-
dimensional concept of valence in the majority of cases is not predictive for
category membership: not all negatively evaluated people are members of one
specific negative category. Fit by necessity depends additionally on a concept
of higher dimensionality: the stereotype. The stereotype contains those traits
that are predictive of group membership (see Le Pelley et al., 2010). Some of
those traits might have the same valence as the category, others might not.
Therefore, in our view, faces with features associated with traits that are pre-
dictive of group membership (i.e., stereotypical traits) will have enhanced fit,
regardless of valence. If a perceiver has a negative evaluation of that category
(i.e., is prejudiced), faces with features that are both stereotypical and negative
will have enhanced fit.
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In sum, we propose that prejudice enhances fit for faces with negative features,
only to the extent that these features are associated with stereotypical traits.
This hypothesis differs from the evaluative fit hypothesis in that prejudice does
not enhance fit for faces with features associated with any negative trait, but
does so on the condition that this negatively valenced trait is stereotypical.
In three studies, the present paper aims to test this normative fit hypothesis.
Study 1 aims to show that people indeed over-allocate faces with features as-
sociated with negative stereotype-relevant traits to a negatively evaluated cat-
egory1 and that this happens to a greater extent for more prejudiced people. In
Study 2 we aim to show that only stereotype-relevant negative traits, but not
stereotype-irrelevant negative traits elicit over-allocation. Finally, in Study 3
we aim to show that even valence-incongruent traits may elicit over-allocation
under the condition that these traits are stereotype-relevant, but then preju-
diced participants will not display enhanced over-allocation.
4.1 Study 1
Study 1 was designed to show that more prejudiced people allocate more faces
with features associated with a negative stereotype-relevant trait (criminal) to
a stigmatized category (Moroccans). Dutch participants were instructed to cat-
egorize faces as Moroccan or non-Moroccan. Half of the faces were manip-
ulated to have more criminal-looking features. After the categorization task
implicit prejudice was measured. Dutch people associate Moroccans strongly
with the trait criminal (Gordijn et al., 2001), thus, the trait is highly stereotype-
relevant. Because normative fit is enhanced for faces with features associated
1By the over-allocation of faces with features associated with stereotype-relevant traits we mean
that participants allocate more faces with features associated with stereotype-relevant traits to the
target category than faces without those features.
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with stereotype-relevant traits, we expected participants to allocate a larger
percentage of the criminal-looking faces to the Moroccan category than the
non-manipulated faces. Moreover, because the trait criminal is both stereotype-
relevant and negatively valenced, we expected more prejudiced participants to
show this effect to a greater extent.
4.1.1 Method
Participants
Nineteen male and 73 female Dutch-speaking students of the Radboud Univer-
sity Nijmegen participated in this study (Mage = 21.59,SD = 2.78). In return,
participants received course credit or €4.
Design
The experiment employed a mixed model design with face set (Moroccan-
looking vs. criminal Moroccan-looking) as within-subjects variable and impli-
cit prejudice as continuous between-subjects variable. The dependent variable
was the percentage of faces categorized as Moroccan.
Materials
Criminal features In order to manipulate criminal-looking facial features, a
pilot study was run to construct noisy images of what people thought a typical
criminal face looks like. In the pilot, 13 male and 22 female students of the
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Radboud University Nijmegen (Mage = 21.17,SD = 2.74) completed a forced-
choice version of a reverse-correlation image classification task (Dotsch et al.,
2008; Mangini & Biederman, 2004). In this task participants were repeatedly
presented with two stimuli side by side (see Figure 4.1b on page 58). Each
stimulus consisted of two random noise patterns superimposed over a base im-
age (see Figure 4.1a). The base image in all reverse correlation tasks throughout
this paper was the neutral male face of the Averaged Karolinska Directed Emo-
tional Faces Database (Lundqvist & Litton, 1998). The noise patterns were ran-
domly generated at every trial2. Within a single trial, one stimulus consisted
of the base face with a random-noise pattern and the other with the inverse
pattern superimposed. Because the random-noise patterns distorted the base
face, the faces appeared to be different in every trial. Participants were instruc-
ted to select the most criminal-looking face over 770 trials. Averaging all noise
patterns selected as most criminal-looking across all participants resulted in a
classification image representing what our pilot participants thought a typical
criminal face looked like (see Figure 4.2b on page 59).
Stimuli Two sets of stimuli were used in Study 1: 35 Moroccan-looking and
35 criminal Moroccan-looking faces. The Moroccan-looking faces were the
classification images of the individual participants in the Dotsch et al. (2008,
Study 2) experiment (see Figure 4.2a for the average Moroccan classification
image and Figure 4.2c for an example stimulus). These classification images
were the result of the same procedure as the pilot study described above, but
with the instruction to select the most Moroccan-looking face. The criminal
Moroccan-looking faces used in the current study were generated by super-
imposing the average criminal classification image resulting from the pilot
2The random noise pattern consisted of superimposed truncated sinusoid images in 6 orienta-
tions (0°, 30°, 60°, 90°, 120°, and 150°) x 5 spatial frequencies (1, 2, 4, 8, and 16 cycles per image) x 2
phases (0, pi/2), with random contrasts (amplitudes). In sum, the random noise was a function of
4092 parameters.
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Figure 1
a) Base Image b) Stimulus Examples
Figure 4.1: Base image (a) and example of stimuli (b) used in a trial of pilot
study
study on each individual Moroccan-looking face from the Dotsch et al. study
(see Figure 4.2d). As can be seen in Figure 4.2, the differences between the
Moroccan-looking faces and criminal Moroccan-looking faces are subtle and
difficult to perceive when presented side by side. A video clip demonstrating
the differences more clearly with faces presented in succession is available at
http://web.me.com/rdotsch/onlinematerials/stimuli.mov.
Procedure
Categorization task Participants first completed a categorization task in which
the 35 Moroccan-looking and 35 criminal Moroccan-looking faces were presen-
ted on a computer screen one by one in random order. Each face was presented
twice, resulting in a total of 140 trials. Participants were asked to categorize
each face as either Moroccan or non-Moroccan as quickly as possible by press-
ing one of two category keys. They were told that noise was added to the faces
to increase task difficulty. Participants were asked to respond as soon as a
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Figure 2
b) Criminal Classification 
Image
a) Moroccan Classification 
Image
c) Original Moroccan 
Stimulus
d) Criminal Moroccan 
Stimulus
Study 1
Figure 4.2: Moroccan classification image (a), criminal classification image (b),
and example stimuli used in study 1 (c, d)
face appeared on the screen. Faces were presented until a response was given.
There was no response-window. The inter-trial interval was 500 ms.
Implicit prejudice Participants then moved on to a Single Target Implicit As-
sociation Test (ST-IAT; Bluemke & Friese, 2008; Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008).
This task measured indirectly how strongly participants associated Moroccan
names (e.g., Ibrahim, Rachid) with positive and negative words (e.g., love,
peace, war, pain). The ST-IAT consisted of a practice, compatible, and incom-
patible block. In the practice block participants classified 10 positive words
with one key and 10 negative words with another. In the compatible block par-
ticipants classified 20 positive words with one key and 10 negative words and
10 Moroccan names with another. In the incompatible block, participants clas-
sified 10 positive words and 10 Moroccan names with one key and 20 negative
words with another. Block order was counter-balanced. Within blocks, stimuli
were presented in random order. When participants made an incorrect classi-
fication, error feedback was presented for 1000 ms. Shorter response latencies
on the compatible block than on the incompatible block were assumed to in-
dicate stronger negative than positive associations with Moroccan names (see
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Greenwald et al., 1998), which was interpreted as reflecting higher levels of
implicit prejudice.
4.1.2 Results
Implicit prejudice
Incorrect trials and the first two trials of each block were discarded from the
ST-IAT analysis. Latencies below 300 ms were set to 300 ms (0.04%). Laten-
cies above 3000 ms were set to 3000 ms (0.23%). Analyses were performed on
log-transformed latencies, but untransformed mean latencies are reported (in
milliseconds). An ST-IAT score was calculated for each participant by subtract-
ing the average response latency in the compatible block (M = 694,SD = 110)
from the average response latency in the incompatible block (M = 737,SD =
125), excluding one participant whose ST-IAT score was higher than 3 SD above
the mean. A higher ST-IAT score therefore indicates relatively stronger negat-
ive than positive associations with Moroccan names (i.e., being higher in im-
plicit prejudice). On average participants indeed had stronger negative than
positive associations with the category of Moroccans, t(92) = 5.04, p < .01, d =
0.37.
Categorization task
For each participant the percentage faces categorized as Moroccan was calcu-
lated separately for each face set. A GLM analysis with face set (Moroccan-
looking vs. criminal Moroccan-looking) as within-subjects factor and implicit
prejudice as continuous factor revealed a main effect of face set,
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F (1, 90) = 64.29, p < .01, η2partial = .42, such that participants categorized crim-
inal Moroccan-looking faces (M = 52.93,SD = 19.41) more often as Moroccan
than Moroccan-looking faces (M = 45.64,SD = 18.87). Additionally a main ef-
fect of implicit prejudice, F (1, 90) = 9.70, p < .01, η2partial = .10, and a Face Set x
Implicit Prejudice interaction was found, F (1, 90) = 5.23, p = .03, η2partial = .06.
In Figure 4.5a on page 82 the average percentage of criminal Moroccan-looking
and Moroccan-looking faces categorized as Moroccan is plotted at -1SD and
+1SD levels of implicit prejudice. As can be seen in Figure 4.5a, all par-
ticipants categorized criminal Moroccan-looking faces more often as Moroc-
can than Moroccan-looking faces, but more prejudiced participants did so to a
greater extent.
4.1.3 Discussion
As predicted participants allocated a larger percentage of the criminal-looking
faces to the Moroccan category than of the non-manipulated faces. Moreover,
more prejudiced participants showed this effect to a greater extent. This bias
of highly prejudiced people towards over-allocation of criminal-looking faces
to the Moroccan category supports our theoretical proposition: Highly pre-
judiced individuals more strongly endorse the stereotype that Moroccans are
criminal and therefore expect Moroccan faces to look more criminal (as has
been shown by Dotsch et al., 2008). Because these expectations affect normat-
ive fit, all people are more likely to categorize more criminal-looking faces as
Moroccan, but highly prejudiced people do so to a greater extent. This hypo-
thesized effect of prejudice on categorization has been clearly demonstrated in
the present study.
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However, it may be argued that the obtained effects are primarily based on
valence. Ruys et al. (2008) proposed an evaluative fit hypothesis such that so-
cial categorization should be facilitated for exemplars that are evaluatively con-
gruent with the target category. For example, Ruys et al. showed that stimulus
persons’ attractiveness (a positive feature) enhanced the speed of categorizing
brides (a positive category) but not prostitutes (a negative category). In a sim-
ilar vein, prejudiced participants in our study might have been more prone to
allocate any negative-looking face to a negatively evaluated category, regard-
less of whether the negative features were stereotypical or not. In that case,
normative fit would coincide with evaluative fit. The next study was designed
to refute the idea that valence in itself (i.e, any negative trait) suffices to facilit-
ate category allocation to the Moroccan category.
4.2 Study 2
We propose that evaluative fit plays a substantial role in category selection,
on the condition that it originates from stereotype-relevant dimensions. In
the Ruys et al. (2008) study the categorization of the negative category pros-
titutes was not influenced by the valence originating from attractiveness, but
the positive category brides was. As Ruys and colleagues already alluded to
in their discussion of these results, the lack of facilitation for unattractive pros-
titutes might be caused by the relative stereotype-irrelevance of attractiveness
for that category. Stereotypes contain traits that people believe are predictive
of category membership (Le Pelley et al., 2010). Walking on the street in daily
life, the category prostitute will not be frequently activated for (un)attractive-
looking people (we hope). Therefore, attractiveness is not predictive of being
a prostitute and will not be part of the prostitute stereotype. Brides on the
other hand often look their best on their wedding day, causing a far stronger
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association with attractiveness. Because attractiveness is stereotype-relevant
for brides, participants in the Ruys et al. study were faster in allocating at-
tractive women to the bride category than unattractive women. Because at-
tractiveness was stereotype-irrelevant for prostitutes, participants in the same
study were equally fast in allocating attractive and unattractive women to the
prostitute category, despite evaluative congruence of unattractive women and
prostitutes.
In line with this argument, we expect only facial features that are associated
with stereotype-relevant negative traits to enhance over-allocation to the cat-
egorization of Moroccan faces. To test this, we conducted a second study in-
volving the Moroccan category and two negative traits: criminal and stupid.
Criminal is highly stereotype relevant: When asked to list the content of the
cultural stereotypes of Moroccans, Dutch participants most frequently listed
the trait criminal (70%; Gordijn et al., 2001). The negative trait stupid was not
mentioned in the list of traits named by more than 20% of participants and
was therefore concluded not to be part of the shared cultural stereotype of Mo-
roccans. In Study 2, we expected only facial features related to the stereotype-
relevant trait criminal to elicit over-allocation of faces to the Moroccan category,
but not facial features related to the stereotype-irrelevant trait stupid, despite
both traits being negative and evaluatively congruent with the Moroccan cat-
egory.
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4.2.1 Method
Participants
Twenty male and 113 female Dutch-speaking students of the Radboud Univer-
sity Nijmegen participated in this study (Mage = 21.67,SD = 4.73). In return,
participants received course credit or €4.
Overview and design
Participants were asked to categorize faces as either Moroccan or non Mo-
roccan. These faces were Moroccan-looking, criminal Moroccan-looking, and
stupid Moroccan-looking. Afterwards, implicit prejudice was measured. The
experiment used a mixed model design with face set (Moroccan-looking vs.
criminal Moroccan-looking vs. stupid Moroccan-looking) as within-subjects
variable and implicit prejudice as continuous between-subjects variable. The
dependent variable was the percentage of faces categorized as Moroccan.
Materials
Stupid and criminal features In order to manipulate stupid-looking facial
features, a pilot study was run to construct noisy images of what participants
thought a typical stupid face looks like. In this pilot, 3 male and 28 female
students of the Radboud University Nijmegen (Mage = 21.03,SD = 3.33) com-
pleted the same forced-choice reverse-correlation image classification task as in
the pilot of Study 1, but were instructed to select the most stupid-looking face.
Trials on which participants responded faster than 300 ms were excluded. Six
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participants were not included in the resulting averaged classification image,
because they responded faster than 300 ms on more than 10% the 770 trials.
Figure 4.3 shows the resulting averaged classification image, which represents
what participants thought a typical stupid face looked like.
Figure 3 Study 2
a) Stupid Classification 
Image
b) Weighted Stupid 
Classification Image
c) Weighted Criminal 
Classification Image
d) Original Moroccan 
Stimulus
e) Criminal Moroccan 
Stimulus
f) Stupid Moroccan 
Stimulus
Figure 4.3: Stupid classification image (a), weighted stupid classification image
(b), weighted criminal classification image (c), and example stimuli used in
Study 2 (d, e, f)
To validate the stupid classification image, 26 male and 81 female students of
the Radboud University Nijmegen (Mage = 22.60,SD = 4.34) rated all separate
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30 criminal and 25 stupid classification images on criminality and stupidity on
a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (not criminal/not stupid) to 9 (very criminal/very
stupid). Ratings were averaged across participants for each image. The crim-
inal faces were rated as more criminal (M = 5.23,SD = 0.57) than the stupid
faces (M = 4.94,SD = 0.39), t(53) = 2.17, p = .03, d = 0.59. The stupid
faces were rated as more stupid (M = 5.02,SD = 0.31) than the criminal
faces (M = 4.55,SD = 0.39), t(53) = 4.85, p < .01, d = 1.33. However, the
criminality and stupidity ratings of the stupid faces seemed to be correlated,
r(25) = .36, p = .08. To filter out any characteristics perceived as criminal from
the stupid face and vice versa, we orthogonalized the criminality and stupidity
ratings and used the resulting values as weights to calculate weighted criminal
and stupid classification images (see Figure 4.3b and 3c on page 65). As a res-
ult, the parameters underlying these classification images were uncorrelated,
r(4092) = −.04, n.s.
To validate the weighted criminal and stupid classification images, 22 male and
109 female students of the Radboud University Nijmegen (Mage = 21.40,SD =
3.97) rated the two weighted classification images embedded in a sequence
of six other noisy filler images on criminality and stupidity using the same
scale as the previous rating study. The orthogonalization procedure seemed
to have improved the extent to which the classification images conveyed the
targeted traits: the weighted criminal face was rated as more criminal (M =
7.76,SD = 1.35) than the weighted stupid face (M = 5.40,SD = 1.74), t(130) =
14.54, p < .01, d = 1.52. The weighted stupid face was rated as more stupid
(M = 6.05,SD = 1.64) than the weighted criminal face (M = 5.48,SD = 2.06),
t(130) = 3.25, p < .01, d = 0.31.
Stimuli Three sets of stimuli were used in the experiment: 35 Moroccan-
looking, 35 criminal Moroccan-looking, and 35 stupid Moroccan-looking faces.
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The Moroccan-looking faces were the same as in Study 1 (see Figure 4.3d on
page 65 for an example). The criminal and stupid Moroccan-looking faces
were generated by respectively superimposing the weighted criminal and the
weighted stupid classification image on each individual Moroccan-looking face
(see Figure 4.3e and 4.3f). Again, the differences between the three classes of
stimuli were very subtle.
Procedure
The procedure of Study 2 was the same as the procedure of Study 1, except for
where indicated below.
Categorization task Participants this time categorized one by one and in ran-
dom order 35 Moroccan-looking, 35 criminal Moroccan-looking, and 35 stupid
Moroccan-looking faces into a Moroccan and a non-Moroccan category. There
were two blocks and each face was presented once in each block, resulting in a
total of 210 trials.
Implicit prejudice As prejudice measure, participants then moved on to the
same ST-IAT as used in Study 1. However, due to time constraints, the ST-
IAT this time consisted of only half the number of trials. Block order was kept
constant: the compatible block always preceded the incompatible block.
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4.2.2 Results
Implicit prejudice
Incorrect trials and the first two trials of each block were discarded from the
ST-IAT analysis. Latencies below 300 ms were set to 300 ms (0.06%). Laten-
cies above 3000 ms were set to 3000 ms (0.10%). Analyses were performed on
log-transformed latencies, but untransformed mean latencies are reported (in
milliseconds). A ST-IAT score was calculated by subtracting the average re-
sponse latency in the compatible block (M = 592,SD = 107) from the average
response latency in the incompatible block (M = 627,SD = 122), excluding
one participant whose ST-IAT score was lower than 3SD below the mean. A
higher ST-IAT score therefore indicates relatively stronger negative than posit-
ive associations with Moroccan names (i.e., being higher in implicit prejudice).
As in Study 1, participants on average had stronger negative than positive as-
sociations with the category of Moroccans, t(131) = 5.81, p < .01, d = 0.31.
Categorization task
For each participant the percentage of faces categorized as Moroccan was cal-
culated separately for each face set. A GLM analysis with face set (criminal
Moroccan-looking vs. stupid Moroccan-looking vs. Moroccan-looking) as a
three-level within-subjects factor and implicit prejudice as continuous factor
revealed both a main effect of face set, F (2, 129) = 60.33, p < .01, η2partial = .48,
and a Face Set x Implicit Prejudice interaction, F (2, 129) = 3.74, p = .03, η2partial
= .06. Figure 4.5b on page 82 plots the results at -1 SD and +1 SD levels of
implicit prejudice. Planned Helmert contrasts revealed that the implicit preju-
dice effect for criminal Moroccan-looking faces differed from the implicit pre-
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judice effect for Moroccan-looking and stupid Moroccan-looking faces com-
bined, F (1, 130) = 4.21, p = .03, η2partial = .03. The implicit prejudice effect
did not differ between the latter two levels, F (1, 130) = 0.06, n.s. These effects
were further explored in two separate GLM analyses with two-level face set
factors: one with the levels Moroccan-looking vs. criminal Moroccan-looking
faces and one with the levels Moroccan-looking vs. stupid Moroccan-looking.
Criminal faces A GLM analysis with face set (Moroccan-looking vs. criminal
Moroccan-looking) as two-level within-subjects factor and implicit prejudice
as continuous factor replicated the main effect of face set found in Study 1,
F (1, 130) = 51.92, p < .01, η2partial = .29, such that participants categorized
criminal Moroccan-looking faces (M = 59.61,SD = 17.27) more often as Mo-
roccan than Moroccan-looking faces (M = 52.22,SD = 17.39). Additionally the
Face Set x Implicit Prejudice interaction was replicated, F (1, 130) = 6.55, p =
.01, η2partial = .05, in the expected direction (see Figure 4.5b on page 82): more
prejudiced participants over-included more criminal Moroccan-looking faces
in the Moroccan category.
Stupid faces A GLM analysis with face set (Moroccan-looking vs. stupid
Moroccan-looking) as two-level within-subjects factor and implicit prejudice
as continuous factor only revealed a main effect of face set, F (1, 130) = 113.03,
p < .01, η2partial = .47, such that participants categorized stupid Moroccan-
looking faces (M = 41.17,SD = 22.02) less often as Moroccan than Moroccan-
looking faces (M = 52.22,SD = 17.39). There was no interaction with preju-
dice.
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4.2.3 Discussion
As predicted, participants over-allocated criminal faces to the Moroccan cat-
egory. Additionally, participants under-allocated stupid faces to the Moroccan
category. These results go directly against the evaluative fit hypothesis. Cat-
egorization in Study 2 was affected by more than valence alone. Both crimin-
ality and stupidity are negative traits and therefore congruent with the negat-
ive valence of the Moroccan category. However only superimposing features
associated with the stereotype-relevant trait criminal on Moroccan faces eli-
cited over-allocation. Contrarily, superimposing features associated with the
stereotype-irrelevant trait stupid evoked under-allocation. Thus, valence con-
tributed to fit only to the extent that it derives from stereotype-relevant traits.
Moreover, more prejudiced participants allocated more criminal – but not stu-
pid – Moroccan-looking faces to the Moroccan category. This suggests that the
influence of implicit prejudice on category allocation is also restricted to faces
with features associated with stereotype-relevant traits.
4.3 Study 3
In both Study 1 and 2 the trait criminal enhanced allocation of faces to the
Moroccan category. Study 2 demonstrated that not any negative trait enhances
over-allocation to a stigmatized category, but only negative stereotype-relevant
traits. In Study 3 we aimed to test whether the same negative trait that elicits
over-allocation to one stigmatized category, does not elicit it for another stig-
matized category. Moreover, Study 3 included a positive stereotype-relevant
trait, which, if it still causes over-allocation of faces conveying that trait for a
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stigmatized category, would be even stronger evidence against the evaluative
fit hypothesis, and in favor of a normative fit explanation.
Study 3 used the category of homosexual men, which can be perceived from
faces (Rule & Ambady, 2008a; Rule, Ambady, Adams Jr, & Macrae, 2008), and
two traits: the trait criminal – which is stereotype-irrelevant for homosexual
men – and the stereotype-relevant trait feminine. Feminine is the most stereo-
typic personality trait ascribed to homosexual men (Madon, 1997). We expec-
ted participants to over-allocate feminine homosexual-looking faces to the ho-
mosexual category, but not criminal homosexual-looking faces. Because Study
2 showed that the influence of prejudice is restricted to stereotype-relevant
traits, we also expected that if any effect of prejudice on category allocation
would emerge, it would be obtained only for faces with features associated
with the stereotype-relevant trait, i.e. feminine. We assumed feminine to be a
positive trait, although the evidence for this is mixed. In many – but not all –
cases, feminine or stereotypically female traits are judged to be more positive
than masculine traits (e.g., Der-Karabetian & Smith, 1977; Silvern & Ryan, 1983,
but see Eagly & Mladinic, 1994). Within the context of faces, a meta-analysis
on attractiveness (Rhodes, 2006) showed that feminine female faces are clearly
more attractive. More importantly for the current study, there is evidence for
a preference for feminized male faces (Penton-Voak, Jacobson, & Trivers, 2004;
Perrett et al., 1998; Rhodes, Hickford, & Jeffery, 2000), primarily in the case of
using female facial averages to transform male facial images (Rennels, Bron-
stad, & Langlois, 2008; Rhodes, 2006). This is similar to the procedure in this
study: superimposing a feminine classification image onto a male base face.
Because femininity, in the context of the current stimuli, is a positive trait, we
expected participants who are negatively prejudiced towards the homosexual
category to allocate less of the feminine faces to the homosexual category. We
expected prejudice towards homosexuals to be unrelated to the allocation of
faces with features associated with the stereotype-irrelevant trait criminal.
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4.3.1 Method
Participants
Three male and 42 female heterosexual Dutch-speaking students of the Rad-
boud University Nijmegen participated in this study (Mage = 21.76,
SD = 2.52). In return, participants received course credit or €4.
Overview and design
Participants were asked to categorize faces as either homosexual or non-homo-
sexual. These faces were homosexual-looking, criminal homosexual-looking,
and feminine homosexual-looking. Afterwards, implicit prejudice was meas-
ured. The experiment used a mixed model design with face set (homosexual-
looking vs. criminal homosexual-looking vs. feminine homosexual-looking) as
within-subjects variable and implicit prejudice towards homosexuality as con-
tinuous between-subjects variable. The dependent variable was the percentage
of faces categorized as homosexual.
Materials
Homosexual and feminine features In order to create homosexual-looking
faces and to manipulate feminine-looking facial features, a pilot study was
run to construct noisy images of what people thought typical homosexual and
feminine faces look like. In the pilot, 13 male and 54 female students of the
Radboud University Nijmegen (Mage = 22.19,SD = 5.25) completed the same
forced-choice reverse-correlation image classification task as in the previous
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pilots. Thirty-five participants were instructed to select the most homosexual-
looking face, whereas 32 other participants were instructed to select the most
feminine-looking face. Trials on which participants responded faster than 300
ms were removed. Figure 4.4 shows the resulting averaged classification im-
ages, which represent what participants thought typical homosexual and fem-
inine faces looked like.
Figure 4
Study 3
a) Homosexual Classification 
Image
b) Feminine Classification 
Image
c) Original Homosexual 
Stimulus
d) Criminal Homosexual 
Image
e) Feminine Homosexual 
Image
Figure 4.4: Homosexual classification image (a), feminine classification image
(b), and example stimuli used in Study 3 (c, d, e)
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Stimuli Three sets of stimuli were used in the experiment: 35 homosexual-
looking, 35 criminal homosexual-looking, and 35 feminine homosexual-look-
ing faces. The criminal classification image generated in the pilot of Study 1
was used for the criminal homosexual-looking faces. The faces were generated
in a similar way as those in Study 1 (see Figure 4.4 on page 73 for example
stimuli). Again, the resulting differences between the three classes of stimuli
were very subtle.
Procedure
The procedure of Study 3 was the same as the procedure of Study 2, except for
where indicated below.
Categorization task Participants categorized one by one and in random or-
der 35 homosexual-looking, 35 criminal homosexual-looking, and 35 feminine
homosexual-looking faces into a homosexual and a non-homosexual category.
There were two blocks and each face was presented once in each block, result-
ing in a total of 210 trials.
Implicit prejudice As prejudice measure, participants then moved on to a
homosexual-heterosexual IAT (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001; Steffens & Buch-
ner, 2003). This task measured indirectly how strongly participants associated
male homosexual couples (e.g., John + Richard) and heterosexual couples (e.g.,
Matthew + Julia), with positive and negative words. The IAT consisted of a
compatible, incompatible, and three practice blocks, which were always car-
ried out in the following order: In the first practice block participants classified
10 positive words with the left key and 10 negative words with the right. In
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the compatible practice block participants classified 10 heterosexual couples
with the left key and 10 homosexual couples with the right. In the follow-
ing critical compatible block participants classified 10 positive words and 10
heterosexual couples with the left key and 10 negative words and 10 homo-
sexual couples with the right key. The incompatible practice and critical block
followed, with the functions of the keys with respect to the couples switched.
Shorter response latencies on the compatible block than on the incompatible
block were assumed to indicate stronger negative than positive associations
with homosexual couples compared to heterosexual couples, which was inter-
preted as reflecting higher levels of implicit prejudice.
4.3.2 Results
Implicit prejudice
Incorrect trials and the first two trials of each block were discarded from the
IAT analysis. Latencies below 300 ms were set to 300 ms (0%). Latencies
above 3000 ms were set to 3000 ms (0.32%). Analyses were performed on log-
transformed latencies, but untransformed mean latencies are reported (in mil-
liseconds). An IAT score was calculated by subtracting the average response
latency in the compatible block (M = 710,SD = 122) from the average re-
sponse latency in the incompatible block (M = 830,SD = 214). A higher IAT
score therefore indicates relatively stronger negative than positive associations
with homosexual couples compared to heterosexual couples (i.e., being higher
in implicit prejudice). Participants on average had stronger negative than pos-
itive associations with the homosexual category relative to the heterosexual
category, t(45) = 5.65p < .01, d = 0.69, i.e., the category of homosexuals is a
stigmatized category on the implicit level for this sample.
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Categorization task
For each participant the percentage faces categorized as homosexual was cal-
culated separately for each face set. A GLM analysis with face set (femin-
ine homosexual-looking vs. criminal homosexual-looking vs. homosexual-
looking) as three-level within-subjects factor and implicit prejudice as continu-
ous factor revealed a main effect of face set, F (2, 42) = 107.31, p < .01, η2partial =
.84, and a marginally significant Face Set x Implicit Prejudice interaction,
F (2, 42) = 2.67, p = .08, η2partial = .11. Figure 4.5c on page 82 plots the results
at -1 SD and +1 SD levels of implicit prejudice. Planned Helmert contrasts re-
vealed that the implicit prejudice effect for feminine homosexual-looking faces
differed from the implicit prejudice effect for homosexual-looking and crim-
inal homosexual-looking faces combined, F (1, 43) = 5.17, p = .03, η2partial =
.11. The implicit prejudice effect did not differ between the latter two levels
of face set, F (1, 43) = 1.69, n.s. These effects were further explored in two
separate GLM analyses with two-level face set factors: one with the levels
homosexual-looking vs. feminine homosexual-looking faces and one with the
levels homosexual-looking vs. criminal homosexual-looking.
Feminine faces A GLM analysis with face set (homosexual-looking vs. fem-
inine homosexual-looking) as within-subjects factor and implicit prejudice as
continuous factor revealed the expected main effect of face set, F (1, 43) =
101.26, p < .01, η2partial = .70, such that participants categorized feminine ho-
mosexual-looking faces (M = 49.75,SD = 16.29) more often as homosexual
than homosexual-looking faces (M = 32.48,SD = 13.77). Additionally, a
predicted Face Set x Implicit Prejudice interaction was marginally significant,
F (1, 43) = 3.86, p = .06, η2partial = .08: more prejudiced participants, over-
allocated feminine homosexual-looking faces to a lesser extent to the homo-
sexual category (see Figure 4.5c on page 82).
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Criminal faces A GLM analysis with face set (homosexual-looking vs. crim-
inal homosexual-looking) as within-subjects factor and implicit prejudice as
continuous factor only revealed a main effect of face set, F (1, 43) = 122.32, p <
.01, η2partial = .74, such that participants categorized criminal homosexual-look-
ing faces (M = 19.05,SD = 10.93) less often as homosexual than homosexual-
looking faces (M = 32.48,SD = 13.77). As predicted, there was no interaction
with prejudice.
4.3.3 Discussion
As expected, participants over-allocated feminine faces and under-allocated
criminal faces to the homosexual category. These results demonstrate that the
categorization of faces from different stigmatized categories relies on different
trait dimensions conveyed by the faces: whereas the task of categorizing faces
as Moroccan in Studies 1 and 2 elicited over-allocation of criminal faces, the
task of categorizing faces as homosexual elicited under-allocation of criminal
faces. Thus, faces with features associated with negative traits are not neces-
sarily more likely to be allocated to a negatively evaluated category. This is
a strong argument in favor of the stereotype-specificity of normative fit, and
against the pure evaluative fit position. Note in this respect that the criminal
features superimposed on the homosexual faces were, in fact, the very same
features that were superimposed on Moroccan faces in Study 1.
Additionally, implicit prejudice towards homosexuals moderated the alloca-
tion of only the feminine faces, such that more prejudiced participants showed
less over-allocation of feminine homosexual-looking faces. We have to inter-
pret this effect with caution, because the interaction effect was only marginally
significant. However, the finding sheds more light on the way normative fit
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affects categorization. Faces that convey stereotype-relevant evaluative con-
gruence have better fit for highly prejudiced individuals. In the case of the
homosexual category the negativity associated with criminality derives from a
trait that is not stereotype-relevant and therefore does not provide better fit for
prejudiced individuals. Femininity, on the other hand, is stereotype-relevant,
but positively valenced. Because prejudiced individuals evaluate the category
as more negative, faces conveying less of the stereotype-relevant positive trait
attractiveness have better fit.
4.4 General Discussion
In three studies we have shown that social categorization is biased at the level
of category allocation. In Study 1 participants over-allocated faces convey-
ing the stereotype-relevant negative trait criminal to the Moroccan category,
especially if they were prejudiced. In the two subsequent studies we have
shown a double dissociation: In Study 2 the stereotype-irrelevant negative
trait stupid did not elicit over-allocation, but the stereotype-relevant negat-
ive trait criminal did. In Study 3, using the stigmatized category homosexual,
the previously used negative trait criminal did not elicit over-allocation, but
the stereotype-relevant positive trait femininity did. These results demon-
strate that normative fit is higher for faces conveying stereotype-relevant traits
regardless of valence. Moreover, individual differences in implicit prejudice
predicted the extent to which stereotype-relevant traits caused over-allocation:
whereas more prejudiced people showed greater over-allocation of faces con-
veying negative stereotype-relevant traits, they showed less over-allocation of
faces conveying positive stereotype-relevant traits. These results strongly sup-
port our normative fit hypothesis: there is better fit for faces with features that
are evaluatively congruent on the condition that those features are associated
with stereotype-relevant traits, especially for prejudiced individuals.
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Our results are especially striking considering the very subtle manipulation
of criminal, stupid, and feminine features. Looking at the example stimuli in
Figure 4.2 on page 59, it is difficult to see any difference between the original
Moroccan and the criminal-looking Moroccan images. Nonetheless, our subtle
manipulation, which was based on pilot-participants’ criminality judgments, is
strong enough to elicit a difference in category allocation between highly and
less prejudiced participants.
Another strength of the current work is the use of reverse correlation methods
to construct Moroccan, homosexual, criminal, stupid, and feminine-looking
faces. At no point in the current research were any subjective notions of the
researchers about what, for example, a criminal face looks like able to influence
the results. Bottom-up data-driven research methodologies are gaining traction
in research on higher-level cognition (e.g., Dotsch et al., 2008; Langner, Becker,
& Rinck, 2009; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008) and have as primary advantage that
we are testing what is in the participants’ mind, not what is in the researchers’
mind (see Mangini & Biederman, 2004). It is not what the researchers believe a
criminal face looks like that biases social categorization, but what participants
believe a criminal face looks like.
Our work utilized a paradigm in which participants were forced to decide
whether or not to allocate faces to one specific category. However, social psy-
chologists have theorized that categories are activated automatically on per-
ception of category members (Allport, 1954; Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Evans, &
Tyler, 1986, for an overview, see Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). In daily life,
people are mostly not on the lookout for members of one specific category, as in
our task. The cognitive system has ample choice of social categories to activate
(e.g., Moroccan, homosexual, Dutch, Black, Mexican, female, social psycholo-
gist). Future research should address the extent to which the effects obtained
generalize to spontaneous categorization given multiple categories to allocate
to.
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Our results are in line with findings within the emotion perception literature
that racially ambiguous faces with an angry expression are more likely to be
categorized as Black by more prejudiced people (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen,
2004; Hutchings & Haddock, 2008, also see Bijlstra et al., 2010). Based on the
former, Hugenberg and Sacco (2008, p. 1057) suggested that
“when attributes of a social target are consistent with the attrib-
utes of a particular social category (e.g., angry expressions with the
Black stereotype), this can strongly influence category selection”.
Whereas the previous studies focused on emotional facial expressions indir-
ectly derived from stereotypical traits (from the stereotype of Blacks as aggress-
ive to angry facial expressions), the present study shows that facial features
representing the actual stereotypical traits have a direct influence on category
allocation. Moreover, the current work extends previous work by demon-
strating that category selection might sometimes be biased by prejudice in the
opposite direction: for the homosexual category more prejudiced individuals
are less prone to over-allocate faces conveying the positive stereotype-relevant
trait feminine.
The current work further advances knowledge about the relationship between
prejudice and stereotypes. As noted by Wittenbrink et al. (1997), the defin-
ition of prejudice as an individual’s negative attitude towards an out-group
is widely accepted (Ashmore, 1970; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Stroebe & In-
sko, 1989). A stereotype on the other hand reflects culturally shared beliefs
(Devine, 1989) or personal beliefs about an out-group (Krueger, 1996). Amodio
and Devine (2006) provided evidence for the independence of stereotyping and
prejudice. On the other hand, Wittenbrink et al. concluded that on the impli-
cit level stereotyping and prejudice are intertwined (p. 271). We go beyond
both conclusions by demonstrating in what manner stereotyping and preju-
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dice might be intertwined: the biased allocation by prejudiced people thrives
on stereotype-relevant valence.
The demonstrated biases in category allocation might function both as a stereo-
type-maintenance and a prejudice-maintenance device (as has been alluded to
by (Dotsch et al., 2008, p. 980). The reported experiments showed a general
tendency to bias categorization in the direction of a culturally shared stereo-
type, thereby supporting the propagation of a cultural meme (Dawkins, 1976):
As feminine-looking homosexuals are more likely to be categorized as homo-
sexual, the likelihood that a counter-stereotypical (e.g., less feminine-looking)
exemplar will be categorized as homosexual becomes smaller. Without coun-
ter-stereotypical category members, there is no need to change the stereotype.
Moreover, the reported experiments showed a specific tendency of prejudice
to bias categorization in the direction of evaluative congruency: as prejudiced
individuals are more likely to categorize more negative and less positive ex-
emplars into stigmatized categories, the likelihood that these individuals will
categorize evaluatively incongruent exemplars into stigmatized categories be-
comes smaller. If prejudiced people never encounter any positive members of
stigmatized groups (because they do not categorize them as such), there is no
reason to change their evaluation of those groups. They remain prejudiced.
Social categorization (Allport, 1954) has proven to be an important concept in
explaining prejudice (see Fiske, 2005). Ample research has shown the influ-
ences of prejudice on the consequences of categorization. The current research
clearly demonstrates the effect of prejudice on the categorization process itself.
82 CHAPTER 4. BIASED CATEGORY ALLOCATION
F
ig
u
re 5
4
0
4
4
4
8
5
2
5
6
6
0-1
 S
D
+
 1
 S
D
Percentage categorized as Moroccan
Im
p
licit P
reju
d
ice
r(92) = .35, p < .01
r(92) =
 .25, p =
 .02
a) S
tu
d
y
 1
4
0
4
5
5
0
5
5
6
0
6
5-1
 S
D
+
 1
 S
D
Im
p
licit P
reju
d
ice
C
rim
in
al M
o
ro
ccan
 faces
O
rig
in
al M
o
ro
ccan
 faces
S
tu
p
id
 M
o
ro
ccan
 faces
r(1
3
2
) =
 .1
5
, p
 =
 .0
8
r(1
3
2
) =
 .0
0
, n
.s.
r(1
3
2
) =
 -.0
1
, n
.s.
1
5
2
3
3
1
3
9
4
7
5
5-1
 S
D
+
 1
 S
D
Percentage categorized as homosexual
Im
p
licit P
reju
d
ice
F
em
in
in
e H
o
m
o
sex
u
al faces
O
rig
in
al H
o
m
o
sex
u
al faces
C
rim
in
al H
o
m
o
sex
u
al faces
r(4
5
) =
 -.3
2
, p
 =
 .0
3
r(4
5
) =
 -.1
4
, n
.s.
r(4
5
) =
 -.0
3
, n
.s.
b
) S
tu
d
y
 2
b
) S
tu
d
y
 3
Figure
4.5:
A
verage
percentage
of
faces
allocated
to
category
by
face
set
at
-1
SD
and
+1
SD
values
of
im
plicitprejudice
in
Study
1
(a),Study
2
(b),and
Study
3
(c)
Chapter 5
General discussion
This dissertation aimed to test an extended model of social categorical percep-
tion, presented in the introduction. This extended model differs from main-
stream theories of social categorization in that it emphasizes the category al-
location phase in which perceptual input is mapped onto appropriate categor-
ies. According to the model, accessible categories are activated when they fit
category specifications enclosed in the stereotype. The present dissertation
focused on category specifications included in visual stereotype content. Be-
cause there are individual differences in stereotype content, we argued that
people also differ in the visual stereotype content they have and therefore in
their visual category specifications. As a consequence different people might
activate different categories for the same perceived person under the same cir-
cumstances. According to the model, this variation in stereotype content is
predicted by prejudice. Consequently, the model predicts that prejudice not
only influences intergroup bias after categorization has taken place (as has been
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shown repeatedly in the past, see Chapter 1), but also influences the categoriz-
ation process itself, by biasing who gets placed into what category. Figure 5.1
on page 84 depicts the extended model. We tested this model across three em-
pirical chapters. The studies in these chapters are discussed in relation to four
major themes.
Accessible categories
Intergroup bias
Categorical inference
Prejudice
Stereotype
Fit
Perceptual input
Category allocation
Figure 5.1: Extended model of categorical perception
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5.1 Empirical support for the extended model
Two studies in Chapter 2 showed that Dutch participants who were more pre-
judiced towards Moroccans, expected typical Moroccans to look more crim-
inal and less trustworthy. Within the framework of the extended model, this
is evidence for the postulated link between prejudice and stereotype content
(which includes expectations about typical group members). The link between
prejudice and stereotype has been established previously within the domain of
verbal stereotype content (Gordijn, Koomen, & Stapel, 2001; Wittenbrink, Judd,
& Park, 1997). The studies in Chapter 2 established this link for the visual com-
ponent of stereotypes. This is a necessary first step of testing the model, as we
argued that visual stereotype content is mediating the effect of prejudice on
the establishment of fit for a perceived person. Moreover, the studies demon-
strated that reverse correlation methods have the capacity to lay bare visual
stereotypes of stigmatized groups (we will come back to this point later).
From the results in Chapter 2 it is unclear whether the negative associations
with Moroccans cause more criminal visual content or the other way around.
Therefore, the study in Chapter 3 aimed to induce new associations about a
novel group (group X) by asking participants to form an impression based on
behavioral information about and facial appearance of group X members. We
manipulated behavioral information, while keeping group members’ facial ap-
pearance constant. The results showed that visual stereotype content was af-
fected by the behavioral information manipulation. This effect was mediated
by prejudice. Thus, Chapter 3 provided experimental evidence for the effect
of prejudice on visual stereotype content. This finding is important, because it
suggests that the bias in the expected facial appearance of typical group mem-
bers is not purely a function of the actual facial appearance of encountered
group members, but can be caused by group information unrelated to facial
appearance.
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In the study presented in Chapter 3 we used behavioral information of group
exemplars as a source of bias. However, other sources are also possible, such
as trait information about group members or the group as a whole. The re-
verse effect might also take place: because people read trait information from
faces (e.g., Todorov et al., 2008), exemplar facial appearance might further bias
attitudes and face representations, perhaps in interaction with behavioral in-
formation. Note that facial appearance was kept constant in Chapter 3.
Importantly, the bias in visual stereotype content was predicted by measures
of explicit and implicit prejudice. This is, again, evidence for the link between
prejudice and visual stereotype content. Whereas Chapter 2 provided evidence
for this link for one specific real world stigmatized out-group (Moroccans),
Chapter 3 showed that the effect is generalizable to a novel group, and can be
induced after encountering just a few members of a group.
Having established that prejudice affects visual stereotype content, in Chapter
4 we tested the implications for social categorization. According to our exten-
ded model, prejudice affects fit between accessible categories and perceptual
input through visual stereotype content. Faces that better fit the category spe-
cifications represented in the visual stereotype, have a higher probability to be
categorized as such. Indeed, Study 4.1 demonstrated that faces with facial fea-
tures associated with stereotypical traits (in this case criminal) are more likely
to be categorized as Moroccan. This effect was stronger for participants high
in prejudice. This is in line with the findings in Chapters 2 and 3 that highly
prejudiced participants have a more stereotypical (criminal) representation of
Moroccan faces. Because highly prejudiced participants have a more criminal
visual stereotype, fit with the Moroccan category is enhanced for criminal-
looking faces.
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Taken together these chapters provide strong evidence for the effect of preju-
dice on visual stereotypes, and indirectly, for the effect of visual stereotypes
on fit and categorization, thereby supporting our extended model. However,
several important issues are raised by the model and the empirical chapters,
which we will now turn to.
5.2 Valence or traits?
We argued that the visual stereotype contains the typical facial appearance of
group members, comprising of facial features associated with specific stereo-
typical traits. However, the traits we employed in Chapters 2 and 3, trustworthy
and criminal, clearly differed in valence: trustworthy is positive and criminal is
negative. Because also prejudice, i.e., the negativity associated with a category
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Fiske, 1998), is an evaluative construct, one could
argue that we have merely provided evidence for an evaluative account of in-
fluences on the early category allocation phase. In such an account, prejudice
is related to visual stereotype negativity, and as a consequence more negat-
ive looking faces will have enhanced fit for the category. We believe such an
account to be too simplistic, both methodologically and theoretically.
First of all, it is important to note that the reverse correlation procedure can in
principle produce visualizations of representations that differ on dimensions
other than valence. For instance, Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) have used re-
verse correlation procedures to visualize people’s representations of personal-
ity trait dimensions such as trustworthiness, dominance, and competence. Not
all of these traits covary with valence. In fact, Oosterhof and Todorov used
principal component analysis to demonstrate that, whereas trustworthiness
converged highly with the first principal component (which seemed to code for
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valence), dominance converged highly with a second component, orthogonal
to valence. We replicated the visualization of these trait dimensions using the
same reverse correlation procedure as used in this dissertation (Dotsch, To-
dorov, & Wigboldus, in prep). Thus, our procedure to assess visual stereotype
content is in principle capable of producing differences on other dimensions
than valence alone.
Moreover, theoretically it makes sense to differentiate stereotype content in
terms of more than valence alone. For instance, Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu
(2002), in the validation of their influential stereotype content model, convin-
cingly demonstrated that stereotype content is at the least represented by two
dimensions: warmth and competence. The first dimension, warmth, might
be considered a highly evaluative dimension. Likewise, Oosterhof and To-
dorov (2008) demonstrated that a two-dimensional model of face evaluation
represents about 80% of trait variance inferred from faces (as opposed to 63%
for the first dimension alone, coding for valence). Thus, stereotype content is
multi-dimensional (Fiske et al., 2002), and given that visual stereotype content
includes facial representations, those representations too can contain multi-
dimensional social information (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). Thus, there is no
reason for visual stereotype content to be limited to a uni-dimensional concept
such as valence. Although stereotype content might be described to some ex-
tent by valence, assessing stereotype content solely with valence does not do
justice to a system of categories that goes beyond the good vs. bad dimension.
In short, our measure of visual stereotype content is not limited to valence and
there is no theoretical reason to assume that visual stereotype content is lim-
ited to valence. However, the relation between prejudice and visual stereotype
content may still be limited to valence. Because prejudice is an affective or
evaluative construct (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Fiske, 1998), it likely covar-
ies primarily with valenced stereotype content. Importantly, prejudice is not
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a perfect predictor of visual stereotype content. In Chapter 2 we showed that
for the stigmatized category of Moroccans (or for a clearly negative or positive
novel category in Chapter 3), prejudice is a predictor of the extent to which the
visual stereotype contains facial features associated with negative stereotypical
traits. However, as argued above, visual stereotype content might additionally
contain information about multiple trait dimensions, some of which are ortho-
gonal to valence. These dimensions, although part of visual stereotype content,
are unrelated to prejudice.
Let us specify our view on the relation between prejudice and visual stereotype
content in more detail. Prejudice predicts the extent to which the visual stereo-
type contains facial features associated with valence-laden traits. Additionally,
the visual stereotype may contain facial features associated with unvalenced
traits. The extent to which the visual stereotype contains the latter facial fea-
tures is not predicted by prejudice. Moreover, which valenced (or unvalenced)
traits are represented in the visual stereotype is not necessarily related to pre-
judice, but might for instance depend on the belief that certain specific traits
are predictive of group membership (see Le Pelley et al., 2010). This view is
consistent with Stroebe and Insko (1989) and Wittenbrink et al. (1997) within
the domain of verbal stereotype content.
The studies in Chapter 4 illustrate this relationship. The trait criminal is ste-
reotypical for Moroccans and therefore is represented in the visual stereotype
(Studies 2.1 and 2.2). Because the trait criminal is negative, prejudice predicts
the extent to which the trait is represented in the visual stereotype, and ulti-
mately the likelihood that a criminal-looking face is categorized as Moroccan
(Studies 4.1 and 4.2). Other negative traits, such as stupid, are not stereotyp-
ical for the category of Moroccans (e.g., Gordijn et al., 2001) and are therefore
not represented in the visual stereotype. Consequently, prejudice is unrelated
to the likelihood that a stupid-looking face is categorized as Moroccan (Study
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4.2). Likewise, the trait feminine is stereotypical for the category of homo-
sexuals and therefore represented in the visual stereotype. Because the trait is
valenced, prejudice predicts the extent to which the trait is represented in the
visual stereotype (Study 4.3). Because the trait is positive (see Chapter 4), pre-
judiced people are less likely to have a visual stereotype with feminine facial
features (or have a visual stereotype with less feminine facial features), and
therefore are less likely to categorize feminine-looking faces as homosexual
than less prejudiced people. Another valenced trait, criminal, is not stereo-
typical for the category of homosexuals and is therefore not represented in the
visual stereotype. Consequently, prejudice does not affect the likelihood that a
criminal-looking face is categorized as homosexual (Study 4.3).
In short, we suggest in answer to the valence versus traits problem that higher
prejudice entails stronger negative (and weaker positive) stereotypical features
in visual mental representations of group members and that this relationship
is constrained by descriptive stereotype content.
5.3 Visual stereotype or semantic stereotype?
We proposed, in line with Brewer (1988), that stereotypes have a visual com-
ponent, which among other things represents typical group members’ faces. To
what extent did the present empirical work provide evidence for this propos-
ition? One may prematurely conclude that the Moroccan classification images
resulting from reverse correlation tasks (such as those presented in Chapter 2)
represent an approximation of participants’ visual stereotype content and that,
therefore, this research proves the existence of a visual component of stereo-
types. However, the fact that the task relied on pictures on a computer screen
does not imply that participants actually based their responses on pictures in
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their head (i.e., visual stereotype content). To claim that the reverse correlation
task measured visual stereotype content is equivalent to claiming that parti-
cipants matched their visual representation of typical Moroccan faces to the
stimuli on the screen, without activating the semantic stereotype content (e.g., the
trait criminal). However, an equally plausible explanation is that participants
activated the semantic stereotype content about Moroccans (e.g., the trait crim-
inal) and subsequently selected the most criminal-looking face, without match-
ing any visual input to visual stereotype content.
Based on our data, we can not directly distinguish between the two processes.
The best way to pit these two processes against each other is to prevent ac-
tivation of semantic stereotype content during the reverse correlation task.
One possibility would be to conduct a replication of the studies in Chapter
2, in which participants generate a Moroccan classification image, while the
semantic activation of stereotypical traits is blocked. This could be achieved
using modality-specific cognitive load (e.g., Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001). Par-
ticipants would be asked to perform two tasks at the same time. One task is
the reverse correlation described in Chapter 2. Every trial of the reverse cor-
relation task would be preceded by a trial of the second task, a 2-back work-
ing memory load task (Jonides et al., 1997), designed to preoccupy either the
verbal or visual modality during the reverse correlation trial. In 2-back trials
participants would see a picture (in the visual block condition) or the name (in
the verbal block condition) of an object. Their task would be to decide whether
the current object is the same as the object that was presented two 2-back trials
earlier. Modality-specific working memory thus would continuously be occu-
pied by two objects, rendering it unavailable for use during reverse correlation
trials.
If participants indeed rely on their visual stereotype when performing the re-
verse correlation task, blocking the verbal modality should not affect the rela-
92 CHAPTER 5. GENERAL DISCUSSION
tionship between prejudice and criminality of the Moroccan classification im-
age. That is, participants who are more prejudiced towards Moroccans should
generate a more criminal-looking classification image than less prejudiced par-
ticipants. Blocking the visual modality, on the other hand, should lead to a
weaker relationship between prejudice and criminality of the Moroccan clas-
sification image, because participants would not be able to rely on the match
between the perceived faces and their visual stereotype of Moroccans. This pat-
tern of results would support the hypothesis that stereotypes include a distinct
visual component.
If stereotypes are indeed represented by a visual component, in addition to a
semantic component, these components should be discernible on the neural
level using brain imaging techniques. Importantly, it has been shown that
visual and semantic brain areas can be identified in the brain. Visual processing
is primarily supported by areas of the visual cortex (such as V1) and there is a
well-identified network of face selective regions in the posterior cortex, consist-
ing of the fusiform face area (FFA), the occipital face area (OFA), and posterior
superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) (Haxby et al., 2000; Said, Dotsch, & Todorov,
2010). During both visual perception and visual imagery, these areas are active.
Amodal semantic processing, on the other hand, is primarily supported by the
anterior temporal lobes (ATL; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007), a severely de-
generated area in patients suffering from semantic dementia. Over time, these
patients lose knowledge about properties of everyday objects in the context of
otherwise well-preserved cognition (e.g., Warrington, 1975).
Based on the fact that different brain areas are involved in semantic versus
visual processing, the following experiment could be conducted using fMRI
to get more insight into what kinds of representations are being used by par-
ticipants while performing the reverse correlation task. A reverse correlation
task identical to the one in Chapter 2 would be followed by a semantic task
5.3. VISUAL STEREOTYPE OR SEMANTIC STEREOTYPE? 93
and a visual task. In the semantic task, participants would repeatedly choose
from two traits the trait which according to them is most stereotypical for Mo-
roccans. In the visual task, participants would repeatedly decide for two faces
whether they belong to the same ethnicity. These faces would be drawn from
a pool of faces with features associated with several ethnicities, half of which
Moroccan.
The reverse correlation task is hypothesized to lay bare visual stereotype con-
tent, to the extent that it is related to prejudice. Whether this is the case, can
be inferred from spontaneous brain activity while participants perform the re-
verse correlation task. The brain activity in the reverse correlation task could be
decomposed into activity specific to semantic processing (based on the overlap
with activity during the semantic task) and activity specific to visual processing
(based on the overlap with activity during the visual task). If there is significant
visual brain activity during the reverse correlation task, and this activity cov-
aries with classification image criminality and prejudice, then there is strong
neural evidence for a distinct visual component of stereotypes captured by the
reverse correlation task.
In the introduction we made a theoretical case in favor of the existence of visual
stereotypes, but we did not provide evidence supporting this contention. In-
stead, we assumed that stereotypes have visual components based on previous
research, and have suggested a promising method to assess those components
(i.e., the reverse correlation procedure). This is important groundwork, but
experiments as those proposed above are required to specifically address the
existence of visual stereotype components. Alternatively, we focused on the
consequences of biases in visual stereotypes for social categorization due to in-
dividual differences in prejudice. Even if ultimately stereotypes turn out to be
of purely semantic or verbal nature, our results are not invalidated. Prejudice
still influences social categorization at the level of category allocation. But, the
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underlying process would differ from the one currently suggested. However,
as argued in the general introduction, we believe that visual stereotype content
provides a more parsimonious model for the data in the present dissertation
than purely semantic or verbal stereotype content.
5.4 Psychophysical reverse correlation methods
This dissertation introduces data driven reverse correlation methods to the
field of stereotyping and prejudice. These methods hold much promise for
social psychology, as they allow researchers to probe internal representations
without imposing their own ideas on what those representations should look
like (Gosselin & Schyns, 2003). In Chapter 4, the reverse correlation method
was used to visualize criminal faces. Conventional experimental paradigms
would have required us to manipulate the specific facial feature dimensions
that we hypothesize to be relevant for the perception of criminality. As a res-
ult, we would risk manipulating dimensions that are irrelevant, committing us
to a larger cycle of repeated experiments. Each time we would have to think of
other potentially relevant dimensions and then test whether those affect per-
ception of criminality until we finally find dimensions that do. Even then, we
would never be sure whether the relevant dimensions that we end up with are
the only ones that affect perception of criminality, if we do not bother to test
more dimensions afterwards. Reverse correlation methods speed up scientific
discovery by offering a data-driven method to identify relevant dimensions in
just one experiment, while minimizing the influence of researchers on the end
result (as stimuli are randomly generated).
Moreover, reverse correlation methods offer the possibility to quantify spon-
taneous processes. For instance, in the reverse correlation task in Chapter 2, we
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asked participants to select the most Moroccan looking face. At no point before
or during the reverse correlation task was criminality (or valence) mentioned to
the participants. Unlike most contemporary indirect measures, participants are
not forced by the paradigm to consider attribute dimensions (valence or traits)
pertaining to the category of interest. If participants do not think about Mo-
roccans in terms of criminality or negativity, they will be able to complete the
reverse correlation task without activating those dimensions. Compare this to
a Moroccan-Dutch IAT (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998). In one block participants
are asked to pair Moroccan names with negative words and Dutch names with
positive names, and in the other they are asked to pair Dutch names with neg-
ative words and Moroccan names with positive words. The IAT clearly forces
participants to adopt an evaluative mindset. Contrarily, in reverse correlation
tasks participants are simply asked to select faces, a decision which can be
based on any dimension a participant deems relevant.
We have successfully employed these methods in several other social psycho-
logical domains. For instance, Karremans, Dotsch, and Corneille (in prep) have
used the reverse correlation method to demonstrate so-called beauty blindness.
Romantically involved and single female participants were asked to memorize
the face of a potential mate who had either an attractive or unattractive facial
appearance. Subsequently, their mental representation of the alternative mate
was visualized using a reverse correlation task (using the same task as in this
dissertation). The resulting classification images were rated on attractiveness
by independent participants. Classification images generated by romantically
involved participants showed less differentiation on attractiveness for the at-
tractive versus unattractive alternative mate than those generated by single
participants.
Imhoff, Dotsch, Bianchi, Banse, and Wigboldus (in prep) used the reverse cor-
relation technique to visualize ingroup projection. According to the Ingroup
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Projection Model, people who belong to a group tend to generalize typical
ingroup characteristics to the superordinate category (Mummendey & Wen-
zel, 1999). Imhoff and colleagues investigated whether the typical facial ap-
pearance of members of one’s ingroup is generalized to the superordinate cat-
egory. To test this hypothesis, participants in Germany and Portugal com-
pleted a reverse correlation task in which they repeatedly had to select the
most European-looking face. German participants generated European classi-
fication images that according to Dutch raters looked more German and less
Portuguese than the European classification images generated by Portuguese
participants.
These are just two examples of the potential of reverse correlation as a social
psychological research tool. Although the possibilities seem endless, several
limiting factors of reverse correlation methods should be considered. First, as
discussed above, it is unclear what the reverse correlation method is actually
assessing. The resulting classification image could be an approximation of un-
derlying mental representations, but could arguably also be a simple response
strategy, unrelated to any mental representations. Even if the procedure does
tap into underlying mental representations, resulting classification images will
always be a function of those mental representations, the used base face, the
specific outcome space spanned by the presented noise patterns, and error.
Second, the resulting classification image does not reveal much about the psy-
chological properties of the assessed mental representation, which could be a
collection of exemplars, a feature list, a prototype, etc. Third, in order to gener-
ate high quality visualizations, participants need to respond to a large number
of trials (the smallest number of trials being 300, used by Oosterhof & Todorov,
2008; the largest being 20.000, used by Gosselin, Bacon, & Mamassian, 2004).
However, if the number of trials is too high, the quality of the visualizations
deteriorates as well, due to participant demotivation. Fourth, because reverse
correlation entails a linear analysis which does not take interactions into ac-
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count, artifacts in the resulting classification images emerge. Mangini and Bie-
derman (2004) illustrate this with the example of an eye-wink. If participants
are asked to select any face that shows an eye-wink in a reverse correlation
task, they will probably select any face with a closed left eye or a closed right
eye. As a consequence, the resulting classification image, calculated as the av-
erage of all selected images, will show a half closed left eye and a half closed
right eye. Needless to say, for all the reasons above, researchers should take
care with interpreting classification images as direct visualizations of mental
representations.
Future developments in reverse correlation techniques might make it possible
to model interactions as well as nonlinear effects. This is difficult with the
method used in this dissertation because the data of at most 770 responses were
used to estimate the values of 4096 parameters. If interactions between para-
meters would need to be taken into account, over 8 million terms should have
been estimated, clearly causing overfitting. One way to counter this is limiting
the number of parameters to those that actually code for changes in the face (a
lot of parameters in the task used in the present dissertation code for changes
outside of the face). Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) solved this issue by using
random changes in 50-dimensional face space, thereby limiting the number of
variables to estimate to 50, and the number of first-order interaction terms to
1225. Although the number of trials used by Oosterhof and Todorov – 300 –
is still too low for taking into account interactions, this development is prom-
ising. Moreover, the number of trials necessary for high quality classification
images might be dramatically improved when researchers employ more effi-
cient search algorithms, which base the presentation of following stimuli on
responses to previous stimuli.
Another recent development is the multiple response alternative reverse cor-
relation task (Dai & Micheyl, 2009), which allows for the visualization of mul-
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tiple categories in the same task. For instance, within the context of the present
dissertation, participants could be asked to complete a reverse correlation task
with ten different ethnic categories instead of just Moroccan. This would en-
able us to identify whether the biasing effect of prejudice on the visual stereo-
type generalizes across other ethnic groups and whether there is a common
factor causing this bias across groups within a single person.
In its current form, reverse correlation is already gaining momentum in so-
cial psychology. In the context of face perception, these methods have been
applied successfully to perception of gender (Nestor & Tarr, 2008), identity
(Mangini & Biederman, 2004), expressions of emotions (Langner et al., 2009;
M. L. Smith, Cottrell, Gosselin, & Schyns, 2005), personality traits (Oosterhof
& Todorov, 2008), and even cross-species categories (i.e., baboon faces; Martin-
Malivel, Mangini, Fagot, & Biederman, 2006; for an in-depth discussion of re-
verse correlation paradigms, see Mangini & Biederman, 2004; Todorov, Dotsch,
Wigboldus, & Said, under review).
5.5 Conclusion
The extended model of categorical perception proposed here (see Figure 5.1
on page 84) builds on a strong foundation of social psychological theory and
experiments. The model follows ideas originally articulated by Bruner (1957),
namely that fit with specifications of accessible categories predicts which cat-
egory will be activated for a perceived stimulus. Our model integrates theories
from object categorization and person perception by stating that these specific-
ations are part of the stereotype content (hinted at by e.g., Blanz, 1999; van
Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 2000; McGarty, 1999). Moreover, our model in-
corporates recent insights of knowledge representation (e.g., Barsalou, 1999)
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by postulating that stereotype content consists not only of purely semantic or
verbal information, but also of perceptual –and specifically visual– informa-
tion. The model was tested within the domain of face perception, capitalizing
on the strong need within social psychology to use more ecologically valid
stimuli (Brewer, 1988; Carlston, 1994; Feldman, 1988; McArthur & Baron, 1983;
McGarty, 2002; Zebrowitz, 1996, 2006; Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008), espe-
cially in person perception research, in which the use of verbal category labels
as stimuli has been the rule more than the exception.
Traditionally, social psychologists treated social categorization as a process that
biases subsequent perception, cognition, and behavior. The extended model on
the other hand entails the proposition that the categorization process itself is
subject to biases, moderated by prejudice and constrained by visual stereotype
content. The empirical work in the previous chapters supports the idea that so-
cial categorization is biased by prejudice and suggests a crucial role for visual
stereotype content in this process. However, as discussed above, the work is
not yet done. Specifically, the existence of distinct visual or perceptual stereo-
type content above and beyond verbal or semantic stereotype content is still
tentative. In applying reverse correlation paradigms to stereotype research, the
present work provides new tools to tackle the age old problem of conceptual
knowledge representation (e.g., Fodor, 1998) in a social context.
After having discussed the theoretical and methodological implications and
insights, one important question is left unasked: Why does the bias in social
categorization occur? We propose that the visual stereotype and categorization
biases identified in this dissertation fuel stereotype and prejudice maintenance.
The reported experiments in Chapter 4 showed a general tendency to bias cat-
egorization in the direction of a culturally shared stereotype, thereby support-
ing the propagation of a cultural meme (Dawkins, 1976): As feminine-looking
homosexuals are more likely to be categorized as homosexual, the likelihood
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that a counter-stereotypical (e.g., less feminine-looking) exemplar will be cat-
egorized as homosexual becomes smaller. Without counter-stereotypical cat-
egory members, there is no need for stereotype change to occur. And so the
stereotype perpetuates.
Moreover, the experiments reported in Chapter 4 showed a specific tendency
of prejudice to bias categorization in the direction of evaluative congruency:
as prejudiced individuals are more likely to categorize more negative and less
positive exemplars into stigmatized categories, the likelihood that these indi-
viduals will categorize evaluatively incongruent exemplars into stigmatized
categories becomes smaller. If prejudiced people never encounter any positive
members of stigmatized groups (because they do not categorize them as such),
there is no reason to change their evaluation of those groups. They remain
prejudiced.
In our extended model of categorical social perception, stereotypes play a fun-
damental role in perception, beyond filling in informational gaps about cat-
egorized individuals. That is, perceiving and understanding objects and people
requires an informational construct which facilitates pattern matching (cat-
egorization) as well as pattern completion (stereotype activation). However,
as argued in the introduction, in mainstream social psychology only one func-
tion – pattern completion – has become associated with the stereotype. The
extended model is the first model to reinstate the stereotype’s other function:
pattern matching. Ultimately, Lippmann (1922) foresaw this function of stereo-
types when he wrote that
“for the most part, we do not see and then define; we define first
and then see.”
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Het waarnemen van andere mensen in het dagelijks leven is een complex pro-
ces. Het lijkt zo simpel: je ziet iemand over straat lopen en je weet zonder
na te denken of de persoon man of vrouw is, jong of oud, Marokkaans of Ne-
derlands (Brewer, 1988). Dit proces, waarin personen die je waarneemt auto-
matisch in relevante categorieën worden ingedeeld, heet sociale categorisatie
(Allport, 1954). Mensen worden voornamelijk in termen van hun categorielid-
maatschap waargenomen in plaats van hun individuerende kenmerken. Dat
heeft voordelen, omdat gaten in kennis over de waargenomen persoon opge-
vuld worden met kennis over de categorie (het stereotype). Zo kunnen mensen
makkelijk op basis van slechts weinig informatie besluiten hoe ze omgaan met
de waargenomen persoon: kom ik dichterbij of vermijd ik deze persoon? So-
ciaal psychologen hebben in de afgelopen zestig jaar veel onderzoek verricht
naar dit proces (Tajfel, 1969), dat de basis vormt van vooroordelen en discrimi-
natie.
Hoewel veel bekend is over de gevolgen van sociale categorisatie, is er bij so-
ciaal psychologen vrij weinig bekend over wat plaats vindt vóór sociale cate-
gorisatie. Het antwoord op de vraag hoe lichtgolven die op het netvlies val-
len uiteindelijk tot de waarneming van bijvoorbeeld een jonge Marokkaanse
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jongen leiden is nog onduidelijk. Op een bepaald punt in het waarnemings-
proces in de hersenen dient de binnenkomende visuele informatie omgezet te
worden in de kennis dat wat waargenomen wordt een persoon is die tot een
bepaalde categorie behoort. Uit eerder onderzoek is al duidelijk welke facto-
ren bepalen welke categorie geselecteerd wordt als meerdere categorieën van
toepassing zijn (zie bijvoorbeeld Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010). Maar hoe bepaalt
het cognitieve systeem welke categorieën überhaupt van toepassing zijn op de
binnenkomende visuele informatie? Deze vraag is de kern van dit proefschrift.
Wanneer is een bepaalde categorie van toepassing op een waargenomen per-
soon? In de afgelopen decennia is gesuggereerd dat categorietoepasselijkheid
afhangt van normatieve fit tussen een waargenomen persoon en een categorie
(Bruner, 1957; Oakes, 1987; van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 2000). Norma-
tieve fit refereert aan de mate waarin eigenschappen van een persoon over-
eenkomen met de eigenschappen die een waarnemer van categorieleden ver-
wacht. Deze verwachtingen zijn onderdeel van het stereotype (Stangor & Schal-
ler, 1996). Hieruit volgt dat stereotypen betrokken zijn bij het vaststellen van
normatieve fit en dus bij het indelen van personen in categorieën. Dat stereo-
typen deze rol spelen is nooit eerder geëxpliciteerd door sociaal psychologen,
hoewel sommigen wel dichtbij kwamen (Blanz, 1999; van Knippenberg & Dijk-
sterhuis, 2000; McGarty, 1999). Voor zover wij weten bestaat tot op heden geen
empirisch werk over de invloed van stereotype-inhoud op de allocatie van so-
ciale categorieën.
In dit proefschrift hebben we getracht de rol van stereotype-inhoud op de al-
locatie van sociale categorieën te beschrijven. We hebben deze rol getoetst aan
de hand van het categoriseren van gezichten. Gezichten zijn een belangrijke
bron van sociale informatie (Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010) en trekken onmiddel-
lijk de aandacht wanneer een ander waargenomen wordt (Fletcher-Watson et
al., 2008). In het door ons voorgestelde uitgebreide model van sociale categori-
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satie stellen we dat stereotypen visuele informatie bevatten die het uiterlijk van
typische groepsleden omschrijft (zie Figuur 1.2 op pagina 13). Dit voorstel is
eigenlijk al heel oud; de oorspronkelijke definitie van het woord stereotype van
Lippmann in 1922 was “pictures in our heads” (plaatjes in onze hoofden). In
ons model wordt die visuele informatie door het categorisatieproces gebruikt
als vergelijkingskader om normatieve fit vast te stellen. Hoe beter een waar-
genomen gezicht bij de visuele informatie in het stereotype behorend bij een
bepaalde categorie past, des te beter de normatieve fit met die specifieke cate-
gorie, en des te groter de kans dat dat gezicht in die categorie ingedeeld wordt.
Bijvoorbeeld, in Nederland heerst het stereotype over Marokkaanse jongeren
dat ze crimineel zijn (Gordijn et al., 2001). Wij veronderstellen dat als gevolg
hiervan het visuele stereotype over Marokkanen crimineel-uitziende gezichten
bevat en dat daarom mensen verwachten dat Marokkaanse gezichten er crimi-
neel uitzien en dus geneigd zijn crimineel-uitziende gezichten als Marokkaans
te categoriseren.
Om het visuele stereotype over Marokkanen bloot te leggen hebben we een
taak ontwikkeld op basis van een in de cognitieve psychologie reeds bestaande
taak, een zogenaamde psychophysical reverse correlation image classification taak
(Dotsch et al., 2008; Mangini & Biederman, 2004; Todorov et al., under review).
In deze taak kregen proefpersonen herhaaldelijk twee met ruis bedekte gezich-
ten te zien (zie Figuur 2.1 op pagina 24), waarvan zij aangaven welke van de
twee het meest Marokkaans op hen over kwam. Feitelijk werd steeds hetzelfde
gezicht getoond, met steeds andere ruis. De ruis vertekende de gezichten,
waardoor het lijkt alsof elk gepresenteerd gezicht een andere is. Op basis van
de keuzes die proefpersonen maken kan een computeralgoritme uitrekenen en
visualiseren welke ruis op een gezicht geprojecteerd moet worden om aan de
verwachtingen die een proefpersoon heeft van typisch Marokkaanse gezichten
te voldoen. De uitkomsten hiervan zijn een indicatie van het visuele stereotype
van proefpersonen (zie Figuur 2.2 op pagina 25 voor de visualisaties).
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Niet iedereen heeft hetzelfde stereotype over Marokkanen. Terwijl sommigen
Marokkanen sterk met criminaliteit associëren, zullen anderen die associatie
veel minder sterk hebben. Met een impliciete associatie taak (IAT; Greenwald
et al., 1998) is het mogelijk om op basis van reactietijden te schatten hoe sterk de
negatieve associaties met Marokkanen bij een proefpersoon zijn (ook wel im-
pliciete bevooroordeeldheid genoemd). Bevooroordeeldheid wordt door so-
ciaal psychologen gedefinieerd als de mate waarin mensen negatief denken
over een groep (Wittenbrink et al., 1997; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010) en de IAT
meet dat op indirecte wijze. De mate waarin proefpersonen bevooroordeeld
zijn beïnvloedt de inhoud van stereotypen (Gordijn et al., 2001; Wittenbrink
et al., 1997). Met andere woorden, de negatieve associaties met Marokkanen
voorspellen in welke mate het stereotype van proefpersonen over Marokka-
nen negatieve kenmerken bevat. In de studies in Hoofdstuk 2 van dit proef-
schrift wordt aangetoond dat dit ook tot uiting komt in het visuele stereotype:
proefpersonen die sterke negatieve associaties hadden met Marokkanen ver-
wachtten dat typisch Marokkaanse gezichten er crimineler uitzagen.
Het lijkt dus zo te zijn dat mensen visuele stereotypen hebben over groepen en
dat die visuele stereotypen per persoon kunnen verschillen. Het is de vraag
waar deze visuele stereotypen vandaan komen. In Hoofdstuk 3 onderzochten
we of visuele stereotypen kunnen ontstaan op basis van beschrijving van ge-
dragingen van categorieleden. Tegelijkertijd konden we hier de voorgestelde
causale relatie tussen impliciete bevooroordeeldheid en visueel stereotype aan-
tonen. Deze relatie werd in Hoofdstuk 2 met bestaande groepen correlationeel
aangetoond, maar onduidelijk bleef of impliciete vooroordelen visuele stereo-
typen beïnvloeden of andersom. Om de richting van deze relatie aan te tonen
maakten we in Hoofdstuk 3 gebruik van stereotypen over een nieuwe groep
die tot proefpersonen in het lab aankwamen niet bestond: Groep X. We ge-
bruikten een stereotypeformatie paradigma gebaseerd op werk van Crawford
et al. (2002), waarin aan proefpersonen gevraagd werd om een indruk te vor-
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men van groep X op basis van gezichten en gedragsbeschrijvingen. De in-
houd van de gedragsbeschrijvingen was gemanipuleerd. Voor de helft van de
proefpersonen waren de beschreven gedragingen voornamelijk crimineel van
aard, voor de andere helft waren deze voornamelijk betrouwbaar van aard.
Beide groepen proefpersonen kregen wel allemaal dezelfde gezichten te zien.
Achteraf werden zowel de visuele stereotypen over groep X gemeten (met een
zelfde taak als in Hoofdstuk 2, met visualisaties van typische groep X gezichten
als uitkomst) als de mate van bevooroordeeldheid.
Zoals verwacht waren proefpersonen in de criminele gedragsbeschrijvingen
conditie meer bevooroordeeld over groep X (impliciet en expliciet) dan proef-
personen in de betrouwbare gedragsbeschrijvingen conditie. Bovendien zagen
de gevisualiseerde visuele stereotypen van proefpersonen in de criminele con-
ditie er crimineler uit dan die van proefpersonen in de betrouwbare conditie.
De mate waarin de visuele stereotypen beïnvloed werden door de gedragsbe-
schrijvingen werd gemedieerd door bevooroordeeldheid. Deze bevindingen
zijn om twee redenen belangrijk: 1) ze leveren het eerste experimentele (en
daarmee causale) bewijs voor het effect van vooroordelen op de inhoud van
het visuele stereotype en 2) ze suggereren dat de vertekeningen (bias) in visu-
ele stereotypen niet het gevolg hoeven zijn van de echte gezichten van groeps-
leden die mensen zijn tegengekomen, maar juist het gevolg kunnen zijn van
groepsinformatie ongerelateerd aan gezichten.
Nu vastgesteld is dat vooroordelen de inhoud van visuele stereotypen beïn-
vloeden, werden in Hoofdstuk 4 de implicaties voor sociale categorisatie on-
der de loep genomen. Ons model veronderstelt dat bevooroordeeldheid de
fit tussen toegankelijke categorieën en binnenkomende visuele informatie be-
ïnvloedt via de inhoud van visuele stereotypen. Gezichten die een betere fit
hebben met het visuele stereotype van een bepaalde categorie hebben een gro-
tere kans om als zodanig gecategoriseerd te worden. De studies in Hoofdstuk
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4 laten zien dat dit inderdaad het geval is. Bovendien belichten de uitgevoerde
studies de precieze relatie tussen bevooroordeeldheid en het visuele stereo-
type: bevooroordeelheid voorspelt de mate waarin het visuele stereotype ge-
zichtskenmerken bevat die met negatieve of positieve persoonlijkheidstrekken
geassocieerd worden. Daarnaast kan het visuele stereotype gezichtskenmer-
ken bevatten die met neutrale persoonlijkheidstrekken geassocieerd worden,
maar dat wordt niet voorspeld door bevooroordeeldheid. Welke specifieke
persoonlijkheidstrekken gepresenteerd worden in het visuele stereotype is niet
noodzakelijk gerelateerd aan bevooroordeeldheid, maar kan bijvoorbeeld af-
hangen van welke trekken een voorspellende waarde hebben voor groepslid-
maatschap (zie Le Pelley et al., 2010).
De studies in Hoofdstuk 4 bieden bewijs voor deze relatie. De persoonlijk-
heidstrek crimineel is stereotypisch voor Marokkanen en is daarom onderdeel
van het visuele stereotype (zoals in Hoofdstuk 2 was aangetoond). Omdat cri-
mineel een negatieve trek is voorspelt bevooroordeeldheid de mate waarin de
trek onderdeel is van het visuele stereotype en uiteindelijk de kans dat een
crimineel-uitziend gezicht als Marokkaans wordt gecategoriseerd (Studie 4.1
en 4.2). Andere negatieve trekken, zoals dom, zijn niet stereotypisch voor Ma-
rokkanen (Gordijn et al., 2001) en zijn daarom geen deel van het visuele stereo-
type. Een gevolg hiervan is dat bevooroordeeldheid niet gerelateerd is aan de
kans dat gezichten die er dom uitzien als Marokkaans gecategoriseerd worden
(Studie 4.2). Dit is belangrijk, omdat dit aantoont dat iemand die bevooroor-
deeld is (negatief denkt over een groep) niet blind alle negatieve gezichten in
die groep indeelt. Alleen wanneer de negativiteit gebaseerd is op gezichtsken-
merken die geassocieerd zijn met stereotypische persoonlijkheidskenmerken,
beïnvloedt bevooroordeeldheid de kans dat een gezicht bij de negatieve groep
wordt ingedeeld.
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Tot slot laten we in Hoofdstuk 4 zien dat ons model ook opgaat voor andere
sociale categorieën. In Studie 4.3 toetsen we ons model met behulp van de
categorie homoseksueel. “Vrouwelijk” is een stereotypische eigenschap voor
homoseksuelen en daarom zijn vrouwelijke gezichtskenmerken deel van het
visuele stereotype. Omdat het kenmerk positief is, is de kans juist kleiner dat
vrouwelijke gezichten als homoseksueel gecategoriseerd worden naar mate
proefpersonen sterker negatief bevooroordeeld zijn. Ter ondersteuning van
de hypothese dat alleen valentie-geladen kenmerken die geassocieerd zijn met
stereotypische eigenschappen deel uitmaken van visuele stereotypen, laten we
in Studie 4.3 bovendien zien dat negatief bevooroordeelde proefpersonen niet
meer de neiging hebben om crimineel-uitziende gezichten als homoseksueel te
categoriseren dan minder sterk bevooroordeelde proefpersonen.
Sociaal psychologen hebben zich tot op heden voornamelijk beziggehouden
met de gevolgen van sociale categorisatie. Zodra een waargenomen persoon
gecategoriseerd is, wordt aan de categorie gerelateerde informatie actief: het
stereotype. Het model dat we in dit proefschrift hebben geïntroduceerd ver-
onderstelt echter nog een tweede functie van het stereotype. Het stereotype
beïnvloedt namelijk of een waargenomen persoon wel of niet bij een categorie
past. Het empirisch werk in dit proefschrift ondersteunt dit model indirect,
door een effect van bevooroordeeldheid op visuele stereotype-inhoud en een
effect van bevooroordeeldheid op sociale categorisatie aan te tonen. Omdat het
specifieke patroon van het laatste effect pas begrijpelijk wordt in het licht van
visuele stereotypen lijkt de tweede functie van het stereotype aannemelijk. Dit
proefschrift is hiermee het eerste werk dat aantoont dat het sociale categori-
satie proces, waarvan in de loop der jaren zoveel vertekenende gevolgen zijn
gedocumenteerd, zelf slachtoffer is van vertekeningen.
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